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Abstract
The transmission of Quantitative Easing to aggregate macroeconomic variables through the
yield curve is disentangled in two yield channels: the term premium channel, captured by a
term premium series, and the signalling channel, that corresponds to the interest rate expec-
tations counterpart. Both yield components are extracted from a term structure model and
plugged into a Structural VAR with Euro Area macroeconomic variables in which shocks are
identified using sign restrictions. With this set-up, I show how the central bank can use the
term premium as a single monetary policy instrument to foster output and prices. However,
I also show that there has been a cost channel in the transmission of QE to inflation between
2015 and 2017. This cost channel provides a new explanation as to why inflation has been so
muted during this period, despite the easing monetary environment. Finally, a policy rule for
the term premium is estimated.
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1 Introduction
It was the German Economist Richard A. Werner who first talked about Quantitative Easing
(QE) in a famous article published in 1995. First applied in Japan to fight strong deflationary
pressures, the idea has since flourished and has been implemented in the U.S., U.K., Sweden, and
Switzerland in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis. With its key policy rates reaching the
Effective Lower Bound (ELB) in January 2015,1 the ECB also decided to take the plunge with the
introduction of a Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP).2
A considerable amount of literature has emerged in the past ten years to try to understand the
different transmission channels of QE. Among them, Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)
provides a clear theoretical characterization. This paper contributes to the literature by capturing
the unexplored term premium channel of QE to the economy, and by showing how the bond
term premium can be used as a monetary policy instrument. In particular, I explain how the
counterpart signalling channel of QE can be neutralized and why it can be beneficial. A focus
is made on the yield curve channels of the PSPP programme, as this constitutes the primary
transmission mechanism to interest rates.
The signalling channel of QE was initially brought to light by Eggertson & Woodford (2003)
and Bernanke, Reinhart & Sack (2004), later emphasized by Bauer & Rudebusch (2016). It acts on
the interest rate expectations component of long-term yields and relies on an implicit commitment
by the central banker not to raise policy rates for a long period after starting QE. Because the
central bank would incur heavy financial losses on the purchased bonds if interest rates go up, the
costly measure has only been implemented at the ELB until now: that is, when there was no more
room for conventional monetary policy. As opposed, the term premium channel of QE propagates
through the second component of long-term yields, in rejection of the Pure Expectation hypothesis.
Interest rate expectations can only explain part of long-term yields, the rest arising from time-
varying and maturity-specific term premia. The term premium channel of QE works through the
portfolio balance mechanism, assuming that investors have certain preferred-habitat demands and
different appetence for risk (Vayanos & Vila (2009), Hamilton & Wu (2010)). Consequently, large
central bank interventions on the secondary market force investors to re-balance the composition of
their portfolio towards shorter maturity sovereign bonds (duration risk removal effect) or maturity
equivalent corporate bonds. This leads to global drops in interest rates as asset prices surge.
A source of debate among economists is the relative importance of the two yield curve channels
of QE on inflation and real GDP- a debate which has never been properly assessed. On one
hand, VAR studies are unable to capture the term premium of bonds and have therefore used
workarounds, such as the use of the term spread (Kapetanios, et al. (2012), Baumeister & Benati
(2013)), or interest rate futures as a proxy for expectations (Weale & Wieladek (2016)). That is
inconsistent with a clear identification of the two yield curve channels of QE since both embed
a term premium and an expectation component. On the other hand, New-Keynesian models
1At the time of the QE announcement on January 22nd, 2015, the deposit facility rate was at -0.2%, the main
refinancing operation rate at 0.05% and the marginal lending facility rate at 0.3%.
2In addition to credit-easing measures (lending operations such as (T)LTROs), the ECB implemented an asset
purchase programme named Security Markets Program (SMP) (May 2010 - June 2014). Aimed to ”address the
malfunctioning of securities markets and restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism” according
to the ECB’s press release, the programme was coupled with sterilizing operations to ensure a constant central bank’s
balance sheet. For this reason, the programme was not Quantitative Monetary Easing strictly speaking. Still, the
ECB has also been buying Covered bonds (since July 2009) and Asset-Backed Securities (since September 2014).
Genuine QE was announced in January 2015 and launched in March 2015 with the PSPP and lasted until December
2018. It originally consisted in a monthly net purchase on the secondary markets of around e 60 billion of public
securities with targeted residual maturity of 1 to 30 years. 90% of which had been issued by Euro Area central
governments and 10% by supranational organizations and multilateral developments banks located in the Euro
Area. The amount was later raised to e 80 billion and later downsized to e 30 billion and e 15 billion. A Corporate
Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) targeting corporate bonds had also been introduced in June 2016. See Claeys,
Leandro & Mandra (2015) for a detailed presentation of the APP programme.
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fail to build sizeable endogenous bond premia, due to their linear framework. In no case in
the macroeconomic literature, have authors been able to capture bond premia originating from
interest rate risk and thus isolating the pure term premium transmission channel of QE. Quite the
contrary, the macro-finance literature has shined in building term structure models able to design
term premia since the introduction of affine models (Duffie & Kan (1996)). They, however, usually
do not link the term premium to the macroeconomy. In this paper, I reconcile the two strands of
the literature by combining the use of a cutting-edge term structure model with an advanced VAR
setting to analyze the term premium transmission channel of QE to aggregate macroeconomic
variables. I therefore identify the pure term premium and signalling channels of QE to output and
inflation.
In particular, I first extract the 10-year Euro Area nominal term premium and terminal rate
from a shadow rate term structure model based on Wu & Xia (2016), with a factor rotation as
in Lemke & Vladu (2017). To make sure that the path of the expected short-term rate matches
the perception of market participants, I anchor interest rate expectations with data from surveys,
following Geiger & Schupp (2018). I then plug the two yield components into a monthly Bayesian
Structural VAR with the price level, real GDP and a series of market-consistent PSPP purchase
that I construct using the Euro Area Monetary Policy Database of Altavilla et al. (2019). Next,
I identify a pure QE signalling and QE term premium shock thanks to zero and sign restrictions,
using the algorithm of Arias, Rubio-Ramirez & Waggoner (2018). In addition, to sharpen the
identification of the QE term premium shock I employ Narrative sign restrictions, based on Antol´ın-
Dı´az & Rubio-Ramı´rez (2018) and developed beyond the original framework. I label them developed
Narrative sign restrictions. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to combine zero
restrictions, traditional sign restrictions and Narrative sign restrictions, thus providing the sharpest
possible identification scheme while beating a technical challenge.
The results are twofold. First, I find that the term premium channel of QE had a positive
impact on real GDP with a lag of three quarters, while the signalling channel played little role. I
also show how the central bank can use the term premium as a single monetary policy instrument,
by orthogonalizing the signalling and term premium channels of QE. Second, I show that both yield
channels of QE contributed negatively to consumer prices in 2015-2017 and positively afterwards.
Using a DCC-GARCH model and time-varying coefficient regressions, I find evidence that this
result can be interpreted as a temporary cost-channel in the transmission mechanism of QE to
consumer prices: the reduction in firms’ cost of borrowing generated by a decrease in the term
premium, pushed both PPI and CPI inflation down. That is, assuming that firms have to borrow
in advance to finance capital and labor, a drop in the marginal cost of production encouraged
producers to lower prices so as to gain in market share (Barth & Ramey (2002)). This cost
channel of working capital provides a new explanation as to why inflation has been so muted
during this period, despite the easing monetary environment.
Finally, I estimate a policy rule for the term premium to serve as a governing rule for QE.
Especially, I measure how the term premium has responded to deviation of inflation from its
target and output from its natural level. I find that during the QE period, the term premium has
responded more than one to one to output gap and a little less than one to one to the inflation
gap, with statistically significant coefficients. This implies that the central bank has actively used
the term premium to stabilize the macroeconomic aggregates.
This paper relates to financial studies on the impact of QE on asset prices in the Euro Area:
Altavilla, Carboni & Motto (2015), Andrade et al. (2016), and Georgiadis & Gra¨b (2016) for
event studies, Blattner & Joyce (2016), Koijen et al. (2016), De Santis (2016), and Dedola et al.
(2017) for time-series analysis, and Eser et al. (2019) for a yield curve modeling approach. In this
paper I analyze the impact of all PSPP-related announcements on the term premium, terminal
rate and 10-year Euro Area yield at a daily frequency. As in the literature, I find that QE has
globally flattened the yield curve, mostly via a compression of the term premium. This study
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is also linked to empirical research on the impact of QE on macroeconomic aggregates: Garcia
Pascual & Wieladek (2016), Gambetti & Musso (2017) for a time-series approach, and Andrade et
al. (2016), Mouabbi & Sahuc (2018), and Darracq Parie`s & Papadopoulou (2019) for the theory.
Similarly, I find that the overall macroeconomic impact of QE was positive, with the exception of
the highlighted temporary cost-channel. Finally, this paper is related to Ireland (2015), that builds
an affine term structure model to analyze the impact of a risk shock on macroeconomic aggregates
in the U.S. However, if his risk variable originates from bond risk premia, no link is made with QE
in his study. I am the first to isolate the pure term premium channel of QE to the economy, to
the best of my knowledge.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the term structure models
used to extract a term premium and terminal rate, and Section 3 analyzes the yield curve channels
of QE thanks to the Bayesian SVAR. Then, Section 4 sheds light on the cost-channel of monetary
policy and Section 5 estimates a policy rule for the term premium. Section 6 concludes.
2 Extracting a term premium
In the Eurozone, QE has been implemented at the effective lower bound, when there was no
more room for conventional monetary policy. In January 2015, the Deposit Facility Rate (DFR)
was indeed at -0.20% and there was little scope left for any further rate cut.3 Consequently, any
term structure model employed to recover the yield curve should account for the non-symmetric
probability distribution in the pricing of the short-term rate near the ELB. To do so, I introduce
an arbitrage-free discrete-time Shadow Rate Term Structure Model (SRTSM) in the spirit of Black
(1995), in which the actual short rate is the maximum of the shadow rate and a lower bound. As
in no-arbitrage Gaussian Affine Term Structure Models (GATSMs) that serve as a benchmark in
the term structure literature, I will be able to dissociate the term premium from the expected
future short-term rate. However, as multifactor SRTSMs are non-linear and computationally cum-
bersome, I employ Wu & Xia (2016) linear approximation, that renders the model more tractable
while providing an excellent approximation to the data.
2.1 Gaussian Affine Term Structure framework
GATSMs find roots in Duffie & Kan (1996), but the model presented here is similar to Ang &
Piazzesi (2003) and Duffee (2012). In this framework, the one-period nominal interest rate rt is
an affine function of a state vector Xt:
rt = δ0 + δ
′
1Xt (1)
where δ0 ∈ R and δ1 ∈ RN
The transition equation that governs the state vector under the physical probability measure
P and the risk-neutral probability measure Q is:4
Xt = µ
P + ΘPXt−1 + ΣεεPt (2)
Xt = µ
Q + ΘQXt−1 + Σεε
Q
t (3)
where Xt ∈ RN , µP,Q ∈ RN , ΘP,Q ∈MN×N (R), Σε ∈MN×N (R) and εP,Qt iid∼ MVN (0, IN )
Besides, parameters linking the risk-neutral and physical dynamics are related as follows:
µQ = µP − λ0 (4)
3Still, the DFR was lowered to -0.30% in December 2015, -0.40% in March 2016 and -0.50% in September 2019.
4See Geiger (2011), Section 3.5.2 for more details.
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ΘQ = ΘP − λ1 (5)
where λ0 ∈ RN and λ1 ∈MN×N (R)
Furthermore, assuming an essentially affine form of the log of the nominal stochastic discount
factor (Duffee (2012)), leads the time-varying nominal market price of risk Λt to be an affine
function of the state vector:
Λt = Σ
−1
ε (λ0 + λ1Xt) (6)
where Λt ∈ RN
Then, zero-coupon bond prices are exponential affine functions of the state vector:
Pn,t = e
An+B
′
nXt (7)
So are nominal zero-coupon bond yields:
yn,t = − 1
n
(An +B
′
nXt) (8)
where coefficients An ∈ R and Bn ∈ RN are such that:
An = An−1 +B′n−1µ
Q − δ0 + 1
2
B′n−1ΣεΣ
′
εBn−1 (9)
B′n = B
′
n−1Θ
Q − δ′1 (10)
Complete derivation is presented in Appendix A.1
2.2 Extension to the Shadow Rate Term Structure Model
In GATSMs, yields can freely become negative around the ELB. This is inconsistent with
economic theory,5 as well as with the historical distribution of observed yields. Therefore, I now
introduce a shadow rate model to prevent fitted yields from becoming too negative. As in Black
(1995), I define the short-term nominal interest rate rt as the maximum between the nominal
shadow rate st and a lower bound
¯
rt:
rt = max(st,
¯
rt) (11)
Hence, the shadow rate st contains more information than the actual nominal short-term rate rt
when the former is below the lower bound
¯
rt, while the latter remains economically meaningful.
To extend the GATSM of Section 2.1 to a SRTSM, let us replace the nominal short-term interest
rate rt of Equation (1) by the shadow rate st. Then, we are interested in finding the form of
the n-period nominal zero-coupon bond yn,t as a function of Xt. However, Equation (11) renders
the bond pricing formula non-linear and an exact analytical solution of the model is not available
beyond one factor in the state vector. Consequently, I employ Wu & Xia (2016) discrete-time
approximation.
In their framework, the form of the n-period nominal zero-coupon bond yield yn,t under the
risk-neutral probability measure Q is:
yn,t =
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
fj,j+1,t
5Agents can always hold cash at a zero interest rate.
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where
fn,n+1,t ≈
¯
rt + σ
Q
s,n × g
(
an + b
′
nXt −¯rt
σQs,n
)
(12)
is the forward rate for a loan starting at date t+ n and maturing at date t+ n+ 1,
with g(x) = xΦ(x) + φ(x) where Φ(x) is the CDF of x and φ(x) the PDF. In addition,
an = δ0 + δ
′
1
(∑n−1
j=0 Θ
Qj
)
µQ − 12δ′1
(∑n−1
j=0 Θ
Qj
)
ΣεΣ
′
ε
(∑n−1
j=0 Θ
Qj
)′
δ1 ∈ R
b′n = δ
′
1Θ
Qn ∈ RN
σQs,n = [
∑n−1
q=0 δ
′
1(Θ
Q)qΣεΣ′ε(Θ
Q)q ′δ1]1/2 ∈ R
Complete derivation is presented in Appendix A.2
2.3 Transformation of the factors
To ease economic interpretation, I conduct an affine transformation of the generic latent factors
Xt, following Lemke & Vladu (2017). Consequently, the new latent factors Pt will resemble prin-
cipal components and I will be able to label them level, slope, and curvature as in Nelson-Siegel
language. The same rotation is employed in the GATSM and the SRTSM. Note that this leaves
model-implied yields, term premia and the shadow rate unaffected.
First, define a full rank loading matrix W ∈ MN×J(R) with N the dimension of the state vector
Xt from Equation (2) and J the number of selected yields. W contains the weights that enable to
obtain linear combinations of the observed yields Y ◦t to map the observable principal components
P◦t , such that:
P◦t = WY ◦t (13)
Then, the affine transformation can be re-written:
Pt = P0 + P1Xt (14)
where P0 ∈ RN and P1 ∈MN×N (R)
Both under the physical P and risk-neutral measures Q, the rotated latent factors Pt follows a
VAR(1) process as in Equations (2) and (3):
Pt = µPP + ΘPPPt−1 + Σε,PεPt (15)
Pt = µQP + ΘQPPt−1 + Σε,PεQt (16)
where µP,QP ∈ RN , ΘP,QP ∈MN×N (R) and Σε,P ∈MN×N (R)
Complete derivation is presented in Appendix A.3
2.4 Parametrization
For the parametrization of the GATSM and the SRTSM, I largely follow Lemke & Vladu (2017)
once again, who calibrate a SRTSM for the Euro Area. Their normalization is based on Joslin,
Singleton & Zhu (2011), which leads to a uniquely identified set of parameters.
In this setting, the state vector Xt from Equation (2) contains three factors. It is indeed ac-
knowledged in the literature that three factors are sufficient to account for most cross-sectional
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variations of yields. Moreover, µQ = (µQ1 , 0, 0)
′ and ΘQ from Equation (3) is in ordered real Jordan
form, while the variance-covariance matrix Σε is supposed to be lower triangular. In addition,
parameters from Equation (1) are such that δ0 is the vector null and δ1 a unit vector. On the
other hand, parameters µP and ΘP from the transition Equation (2) that governs the state vector
under the physical probability measure are left unrestricted. The market price of risk parameters
λ0 and λ1 from Equation (6) are also left unrestricted. Note that imposing a restriction on these
parameters will impact estimates of term premia (Bauer (2017)). Indeed, setting λ0 and λ1 to
zero leads the risk-neutral and physical measures to coincide. This parametrization falls in the
case of the strong form of the Expectation hypothesis, i.e. investors require no term premium (or
no compensation for interest rate risk) to hold long-term bonds. In the so-called Vasicek (1977)
model, λ0 6= 0 and λ1 = 0N , so that the term premium is non trivial but time invariant and the
model falls in the weak form of the Expectation hypothesis. On the other hand, my non-trivial
parametrization leads to a non-zero time-varying market price of risk and term premium, thus
departs from the Expectation hypothesis.
In this framework, the measurement equation giving the relation between the model-implied zero-
coupon bond yields Yt and the observed zero-coupon bond yields Y
◦
t is:
Y ◦t = Yt + Σςςt (17)
where Y ◦t = (y
◦
1,t, ..., y
◦
n,t, )
′, Yt = (y1,t, ..., yn,t)′ and ςt = (ς1,t, ..., ςn,t)′ with ςt ∼ MVN (0, IJ) the
vector of observation errors6 and Σς ∈MJ×J(R) with Σς = diag(σς , ..., σς).
To consistently recover the yield curve, I focus on J = 12 yields with maturity three- and six-
month, one-, two-, three-, five-, seven-, ten-, fifteen-, twenty-, twenty-five-, and thirty-year, which
corresponds to n ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 20, 28, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120} as my one-period (short-term) interest
rate has a maturity of three months. In this study, it is important to price long-term yields as QE
focuses on long maturity bonds. Additionally, data employed are monthly average of the AAA
Euro Area implied yield curve from September 2004 to December 2018.7
Besides, a crucial choice is the one of the lower bound
¯
rt. Basically, the lower bound represents the
minimum achievable level of interest rates. Passed it, agents would prefer holding cash to preserve
their savings and the level of interest rates would be insignificant. Unobserved by definition, the
”true” level of the lower bound has recently been a topic of attention. If some define a process
for its law of motion (Wu & Xia (2017), Monfort et al. (2017)), most remain in the deterministic
framework for tractability and better robustness (Wu & Xia (2016), Kortela (2016) and Lemke &
Vladu (2017)). This is also what I do, studying two cases:
Case A (constant deterministic lower bound):
¯
rt =
¯
r = min(0, Y ◦1:T , r
surveys
t+1 ) ≈ −0.857 (18)
where Y ◦t is the vector of observed yields at time t and r
surveys
t+1 is the one-period ahead expected
short-term interest rate from surveys, as described below. This equation shows that the ELB is
actually negative. Indeed, investors currently agree to pay a little premium to be able to invest
in scarce credit-risk free government bonds.8 The spread between zero and the minimum of the
negative yields reflects this premium.
6Standard in the literature, this means that the variance of observed errors is supposed to be the same across all
maturities, which could of course be questioned.
7Data are available at: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/yc/html/index.en.html
8The 3-month German government bond yield has been negative since July 2014.
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Case B (time-varying deterministic lower bound):
¯
rt = min(
¯
rt−1, 0, Y ◦t , r
surveys
t+1 ) (19)
where
¯
r0 = 0. Equation (19) implies that the lower bound is a decreasing function that turns
negative as soon as any observed yield or survey does.
In this framework, my state-space model is composed of a linear transition Equation (2) and
a measurement Equation (17). The latter is linear in the GATSM (Section 2.1) and non-linear in
the SRTSM (Section 2.2). This is because of the nature of yn,t, that comes from linear Equation
(8) in the GATSM and non-linear Equation (12) in the SRTSM. Hence, I estimate the model by
maximum likelihood, based on the Kalman filter for the GATSM (details in Appendix A.4.1)
and on the extended Kalman filter9 for the SRTSM (details in Appendix A.4.2).
A comparison of the term structure models fit is presented in Table 7 - Appendix A.5 to
save space. Clearly, the SRTSM beats the benchmark Gaussian model in terms of fitting (RMSE
is about 3.5 bps lower for case (B)). Besides, SRTSM (B) with the time-varying deterministic
lower bound performs better than SRTSM (A) with a constant lower bound, both in terms of
log-likelihood and RMSE. The choice of the time-varying lower bound is therefore backed by a
better empirical fit. It is the one used to obtain latent factors, term premia and terminal rates
estimates described below.
2.5 Expression of the term premium
I follow the literature in defining the term premium on an n-period nominal zero-coupon bond
as the difference between the n-period zero-coupon yield and the expected short-term rate under
the physical probability measure P:10
κn,t = yn,t − en,t (20)
where
en,t =
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
EPt (rt+j)
That is, the term premium is the difference in expected return between a buy and hold strategy
for a n-period zero-coupon bond and an instantaneous rollover strategy at the risk-free rate. It is
a reward for interest rate risk (that is, uncertainty about future interest rates). As data employed
are AAA Euro Area implied yields, the term premium should here not embed any compensation
for credit or liquidity risk. Purposely, this choice is justified by the will to capture the pure term
premium channel of QE conceived by the preferred-habitat and duration-risk removal theories.
Thus, the channel captured here will be clean from any effect stemming from a lower default risk
or a better market liquidity.
In addition, the terminal rate is defined as the 10-year ahead expected short-term interest rate:
expt = E
P
t (rt+10Y ) (21)
9Other nonlinear filtering techniques include the unscented Kalman filter and the particle filter. Yet, Christensen
& Rudebusch (2015) finds little difference in the results between the extended and the unscented Kalman filters.
Plus, the particle filter is computationally cumbersome, while it would provide little benefit (see Krippner (2015),
Section 4.2.1 for a discussion).
10Other definitions of the term premium can be found in Cochrane & Piazzesi (2008).
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This rate represents market participants view at time t of the level of the 3-month interest rate in
10 years. It therefore embeds anticipations driven both by monetary policy and the state of the
economy.
To make sure that the path of the expected short-term rate en,t matches the perception of market
participants, I anchor interest rate expectations with data from surveys11 as in Geiger & Schupp
(2018):
rsurveyst+j = E
P
t (rt+j) + Σςςt (22)
with ςt ∼MVN (0, IJ) a vector of observation errors as in Equation (17).
Finally, note that assuming EPt (rt+j) ≈ f◦j,j+1,t with f◦j,j+1,t the observed one-period forward
rate, implies that κn,t = 0 ∀ n.12 That is, proxying the terminal rate with forwards is inconsistent
with having a non-zero term premium. This is simply because forwards are not pure expectations
but also embed a term premium. Thus, such approximation would not allow to isolate the term
premium channel of QE and one understands the necessity of a term structure model to obtain
estimates of a time-varying term premium.
2.6 Analysis of the term premium
Figure 1 presents 10-year term premia from the GATSM and the SRTSM, with and without
anchoring short-term interest rate expectations. On the other hand, Figure 18 - Appendix A.5
shows results regarding the terminal rate, i.e the 10-year ahead expected short-term rate.
The first striking characteristics of term premia and terminal rates on those figures is that
GATSM and SRTSM estimates are similar before 2012 but diverge after that date, which corre-
sponds to the start of the low interest rate period in the Eurozone (see Figure 16 - Appendix
A.5). Indeed, failure to account for the lower bound in pricing the term structure at short matu-
rities can lead to under-estimate the expected path of the short-term rate and thus over-estimate
term premia. Consistent with Carriero, Mouabbi & Vangelista (2015) for the UK yield curve, I
find that term premia from the GATSM appear to be biased and that a SRTSM is necessary to
obtain lower bound-consistent estimates of the yield decomposition.
Moreover, anchoring short-term interest rate expectations seem to matter little, both in the
GATSM and SRTSM, with the exception of the 2012-2015 period for the SRTSM. Two reasons for
that: first, the unavailability of survey data at longer maturities makes it difficult to fully anchor
the path of the expected short-term rate. It therefore differs little from the model-based one.
Second, the negative contribution of surveys in the estimates of the terminal rate from the SRTSM
between 2012-2015 can be explained by the fact that market participants probably expected further
policy rate cuts. Indeed, that cannot be accounted for in the model as the lower bound is purely
deterministic and agents are not forward looking. This sheds light on the usefulness of anchoring
interest rate expectations with survey data when using a deterministic lower bound.
Other than that, the counter-cyclicality of the term premium and pro-cyclicality of the terminal
rate is stringent: the former rises by about 2% during the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), while the
latter decreases by the same amount. This reflects two things: firstly, market participants must
have expected a policy rate cut during the crisis. Secondly, investors usually do not like to take
risk in ’bad’ times, so the supply for risk becomes higher and its price goes down (its return goes
up) (Bekaert, Engstrom & Ermolov (2016)). It is so because during recessions a higher macroeco-
nomic uncertainty and volatility drives the compensation for risk that investors require to postpone
consumption (Cochrane & Piazzesi (2005)). However, this pattern is not observable during the
11I use surveys of the 3-month Euribor, three and twelve months ahead, that I adjust for the spread with the
AAA Euro Area implied yield curve.
12The sum of forward premia is equal to the yield premium.
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eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2012-2013 because data employed are AAA rated bonds. That
is, my term premium is a credit-risk free term premium and a pure measure of interest rate un-
certainty. It is therefore expected that it did not hike like lower grade periphery countries’ credit
risk premia.13 In addition, the low level of term premia may have been driven by unconventional
monetary policy measures implemented by the ECB in this period (LTROs in particular).
Other than that, the current low level of the term premium since 2014 can be attributed to the
QE period that started in January 2015, but might have been expected since Draghi’s Jackson Hole
speech in August 2014. In contrary, the fact that the term premium was small around 2007 can be
attributed to the conundrum period, during which yields remained low while expected short-term
rates were rising due to the global saving glut in 2004-2006 (Rudebusch, Swanson & Wu (2006)).
Nevertheless, the role of a lower inflation risk-premium is not to be ruled-out during this period.
Finally, the increase in the term premium in May-June 2015 corresponds to a short-lived de-
terioration in market liquidity (Cohen, Ho¨rdahl & Xia (2018)), while the increase in November-
December 2016 coincides with the lower than expected extension of the APP programme.
Tuning to the terminal rate on Figure 18 - Appendix A.5, it has been continuously decreas-
ing since 2012 with the introduction of unconventional monetary policy measures and negative
policy rate environment. It is now stuck near the ELB, indicating that market participants do not
see the AAA short-rate at a higher level than today in ten years.
Overall, my estimate of the 10-year term premium from the SRTSM with anchored interest
rate expectations is largely in line with the ones of Wu & Xia (2017), Lemke & Vladu (2017), and
Cohen, Ho¨rdahl & Xia (2018).14
Figure 1: Term premia
Term premia between 2004:M9 and 2018:M12
Solid grey areas correspond to recession periods as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
Besides, Figure 17 - Appendix A.5 shows the level, slope, and curvature after rotation of
the latent factors. It is noteworthy that the yield curve has been upward slopping throughout the
13Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece especially.
14Dynamics are very similar even though levels slightly differ as their estimates are based on the OIS Swap curve.
10
sample, as one can judge by the negative sign of its slope.15 Plus, the level of the yield curve has
been decreasing since 2009 and stabilizes around zero at the end of the sample. This is consistent
with the unconventional monetary policies pushing long-term interest rate expectations and term
premia down during that period.
3 The yield curve channels of QE
3.1 Discussion
In the context of the term structure literature, the are two yield curve channels of QE: the term
premium channel and the signalling channel. The term premium channel of QE works through
the so-called portfolio-balance mechanism, as market participants re-balance the composition of
their portfolio after selling assets to the central bank on the secondary market. This channel
would be neutral in a frictionless economy with perfect assets substitutability, as financial market
participants would be indifferent as to swap a government bond for another asset with the central
bank. In the real world, investors have preferred-habitat demands and different appetence for risk
(Vayanos & Vila (2009), Hamilton & Wu (2010)): demand and supply of bonds are maturity and
risk-bearing specific. In that framework, a government bond purchase by the central bank creates
a shortage of long-term safe bonds on the market, that leads to an increase in these bonds prices
and a decrease in the term premium component of the associated yields. The purchase of long-term
bonds also removes duration-risk in the hands of investors and thereby reduces the long-end of
the sovereign yield curve relative to the short-end. Indeed, investors selling bonds to the central
bank adjust the composition of their portfolio, replacing long maturity bonds sold by shorter-ones,
or invest in maturity-equivalent corporate bonds (and other riskier assets). The domino effect of
portfolio adjustments finally leads to a decrease in interest rates on loans to firms and households,
initiating a surge in consumption and investment in the economy. This credit channel is coupled
with a wealth effect driven by financial market profits as asset prices surge and the monetary base
expands.
On the other hand, the signalling channel of QE works through market expectations of the
future policy rate, via the so called Expectation hypothesis. That is, market participants build
their anticipations about the path of the short-term interest rate over a long period, thus driv-
ing the expectation component of long-term rates (Eggertson & Woodford (2003)). Such forward
looking anticipations are induced from current and future monetary policy as well as the state of
the economy.
From the central banker point of view, it has become very relevant to try to shape these interest
rate expectations, so as to reduce long-term yields in the binding ELB environment for the policy
rates. Undeniably, it is also a cheap way to help anchor inflation expectations and encourage
investment. Indeed, in the standard New-Keynesian framework of Woodford (2003), the linearized
IS curve iterated forward only involves expectations of future real short-term interest rate and
inflation. Lowering the path of the expected real short-term rate therefore increases output and
inflation through the IS and Phillips curve. In practice, lowering long-term yields through the
signalling channel also reduces benchmark rates used to price corporate loans. This boosts credit,
therefore corporate investment (as well as household consumption to a certain extent).
Thus, to shape interest rate expectations a central banker has to options: either simply credibly
communicating about his intentions, or conditioning the implementation of a costly measure to
a last resort. That is, when policy rates are seen as stuck at the ELB for a long time and when
there is no more room for conventional monetary policy. The former is called forward guidance,
15The slope is defined as the difference between the short-term minus the long-term rate here.
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while the latter is simply the signalling channel of QE. Especially, this signalling channel relies on
an implicit commitment by the central banker not to raise policy rates for a long period, to the
extent that the central bank would incur heavy financial losses on the large amount of bonds it
has bought, would interest rates go up (and prices drop). In this view, the central bank may want
to keep the policy rate lower than what the Taylor rule would recommend, for its own interest.
Therefore, the higher the perceived coefficient related to financial losses in the central bank’s ob-
jective function, the more powerful the signalling channel. However, I argue that the central bank
could easily freeze this channel to orthogonalize QE with the expected short-term rate component
of long-term yields. I also argue that it may be desirable for efficiency purposes.
Indeed, the central bank could freeze the signalling channel of QE simply by not conditioning
its implementation to policy rates being at the ELB. For example, the central bank could clearly
state that financial losses due to interest rates hike are fully acceptable, manageable and that it
is ready to conduct QE whatever the level of the policy rates. Hence, market participants would
not infer from the introduction of a QE programme that it is a way to artificially lower short-term
interest rates more that it is possible. Furthermore, the central bank could even allow itself to
conduct Quantitative Tightening (QT) in order to reduce its balance sheet exposure to interest
rate risk. That is, the same way the central bank purchased a large amount of assets through
QE, it could sell those off through a large program of Quantitative (monetary) Tightening. Thus,
market participants would not infer that the central banker is implicitly committing not to raise
policy rates for a long time and QE would not impact the expectation component of long-term
yields anymore. The two yield curve channels of QE would therefore be orthogonal.
Above all, freezing the signalling channel of QE so that the policy measure would only be
transmitted through the term premium channel would be beneficial to the central bank for three
reasons. First, it would create a new instrument at disposal for the central bank, by granting it the
possibility to control the term premium. Outside of the context of QE, it has actually been shown
that there are welfare gains to having the central bank respond to the term premium, for example
by including it in an augmented Taylor rule (Carlstrom, Fuerst & Paustian (2017)).16 Second,
isolating the term premium channel of QE would strengthen the impact of the monetary policy
measure. Indeed, the relative importance of the transmission channels of QE is unclear and so is
the sum of their impacts on yields. It is not certain that the two channels do not counteract each
other. In fact, I will show in the next section that there is at least a situation in which relying on
the two channels provides diminished effects, as changes in interest rate expectations phagocyte
the impact of the term premium channel on prices and real GDP. Besides, with the signalling
channel frozen, the central bank could directly target a certain level of the term premium and
adjust the purchases accordingly, instead of choosing an amount of purchase in euro and guess the
impact it will have on yields. Last, it would also ease the management of interest rate expectations,
by strengthening the effect of forward guidance relative to indirect market inference from a QE
programme.
Still, why would shaping long-term yields by acting on the term premium be a desirable mone-
tary policy? As mentioned earlier, textbook models clearly show that the output gap only depends
on interest rate expectations and not the term premium. The straight answer is that these lin-
earized toy models are unfortunately not able to feature any term premium and remain in the rigid
framework of the Pure Expectation hypothesis. If no structural relationship between bond term
premia and real GDP has been found so far (Rudebusch & Swanson (2012)), Economists tend to
agree that lower term premia is expansionary for economic activity (Bernanke (2006)). Indeed,
16As this would require a rich model, I deliberately do not dig that dimension further and leave that for future
research.
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long-term sovereign yields (and so term premia by extension) serve as benchmark to price most
corporate and household loans, and therefore have a direct impact on lending and investment. As a
consequence, not only expectations of the policy rate matter, (which partly explains why forward
guidance has much smaller effects in reality than in these theoretical models). Hence, there is
undeniably a need for models deviating from the Pure Expectation hypothesis and that is why the
literature has increased its focus on this topic after GFC. It is now common to have models featur-
ing both a short-term and a long-term bond, even though it is difficult to build a New-Keynesian
DSGE model featuring a sizeable and time-varying endogenous term premium. Even in models
approximated at the third-order as in Rudebusch & Swanson (2012),17 term premia produced are
too low in level and volatility compared to empirical findings. Thus, tricks are often used, such
as labeling transaction costs or market frictions as such (Chen, Cu´rdia & Ferrero (2012), Kiley
(2014), Carlstrom, Fuerst & Paustian (2017)). Macro-Finance DSGE models perform much bet-
ter in terms of fitting the data, but either do not allow the term premium to freely feedback to
the macroeconomy or impose restrictions that limit the feedback effect. A more structural type
of models featuring a term premium relies on consumption-based asset pricing a` la Creal & Wu
(2019), in which the term premium is derived from the conditional covariance between the bond
and the stochastic discount factor (SDF). In this framework, the SDF is derived from Euler equa-
tion and it is equal to the expected ratio of marginal utilities of consumption at two periods. It
characterizes future consumption relative to current consumption and the term premium is the
compensation investors require to hold an asset that does not deliver wealth when it is the most
valuable to the agent (Campbell (2000)). Yet, once again no link is made with interest rate risk
and its impact on spending. Thus, a last strand of the literature focuses on reduced-form models
that are more flexible. Nevertheless, studies mostly concern the predictive power of the term pre-
mium for economic activity and they disagree. On the one hand, Hamilton & Kim (2002), Favero,
Kaminska & So¨derstro¨m (2005), and Wright (2006) find that lower term premia in level predict
a slow growth, while Ang, Piazzesi & Wei (2006) and Dewachter, Lania & Lyrio (2014) find no
predictive power in the term premium. On the other hand, Rudebusch, Sack & Swanson (2007)
and Jardet, Monfort & Pegoraro (2013) find that a decline in the term premium is followed by a
faster GDP growth. In this paper, I put an end to the debate by providing clear evidence that a
negative term premium shock stimulates real GDP in the context of QE.
Thus, if I argue that lowering the term premium stimulates aggregate demand through QE, I
state that it may also be beneficial in some circumstances to raise it through QT. Indeed, let us
think of a situation where the bank lending transmission channel of monetary policy is impaired,
due to shrunk bank margins in a flat yield curve environment. In addition, suppose the short-end of
the curve is at the ELB. Here, it could be desirable for the central bank to repair the credit channel
by restoring bank margins through a steepening of the yield curve. However, as short-term rates
could not be lowered further, the only way would be to raise medium to long-term yields through
QT. Another situation could be the case of a central bank implementing yield curve control with a
clear target for the 10-year yield as a monetary policy, such as the Bank of Japan since September
2016. In that spirit, a recent debate has emerged about the benefits for the central bank not only
to target the short-term natural rate of interest but also its long-term counterpart or even the
whole natural yield curve, in order to fill the output gap (Dufre´not, Rhouzlane & Vaccaro-Grange
(2019), Jorda` & Taylor (2019)). Then, it may be desirable for the central bank to only adjust
long-term yields so as to address a long-term yield gap, while keeping a short-term interest rate
17Other examples include Rudebusch, Sack & Swanson (2007), Ho¨rdahl, Tristani & Vestin (2008), and Van
Binsbergen et al. (2012). These models need to be solved at the third-order through the so-called perturbation
method and can therefore not be estimated. Plus, term premia produced are far too low in terms of size and volatility,
unless one makes controversy assumptions such as a very high curvature for the utility function, a high degree of
habit persistence or that stochastic shocks are large and highly persistent too. A second-order approximation would
provide a constant non-zero term premium, while the first-order produces no term premium.
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gap put at zero.
3.2 Bayesian Structural VAR approach
In what follows, I set up a Bayesian Structural VAR including the two yield channels of QE,
output, and prices, to analyse the effect of each channel on the macroeconomy. To do so, I or-
thogonolize the signalling and term premium channels of QE using zero restrictions, as the central
bank would do if it dissociates QE from interest rate expectations. In addition, the use of sign
restrictions and developed Narrative sign restrictions provides a structural identification of the
shocks driving the economy. This framework enables me to quantify the impact of QE through
Impulse Response Functions, Historical Decompositions and Conditional Forecasts.
Let us first consider the general case of a vector of size N, Υt, containing the endogenous variables
of interest and Xt, a vector of size M containing some exogenous variables. Its representation in
a VAR form is:
Φ(L)Υt = DXt + t (23)
where Φ(L) = IN −Φ1L− ...−ΦpLp is the matrix of lag polynomials of order p, D ∈MN×M (R)
and t ∈ RN with t ∼ MVN (0,Σ) is the vector of residuals. Beside, let us assume that all the
roots of det[Φ(L)] lie outside the unit disk, so that Φ(L) is invertible and Υt is stationary.
Structural representation of Equation (23) is:
B−1Υt =
p∑
k=1
ZkΥt−k +DXt + wt (24)
where B ∈ MN×N (R) and Zk ∈ MN×N (R) are the matrices of structural parameters, and
wt ∈ RN is the vector of structural shocks with wt ∼MVN (0, IN ).
In the baseline specification of this paper, Υt contains the log-real GDP yt, the consumer price
level pt, a market-consistent measure of the announced amount of bonds to be purchased through
the APP programme bt, the 10-year term premium κt, and the (10-year) terminal rate expt =
EPt (rt+10Y ) extracted from the SRTSM (Equation (20) and (21)):
Υt = (yt, pt, bt, κt, expt)
′ (25)
In addition, Xt is a vector of ones, so that the VAR only includes a constant.
An obvious criticism of constant parameter SVARs is that they do not allow for a change in
the underlying structural relationships, that may arise through time. Yet, time-varying parameter
SVARs identified with sign restrictions have recently been criticized for their inconsistency with
Bayesian inference (Bognanni (2018)). Plus, no algorithm has been developed for the use of Nar-
rative sign restrictions in time-varying parameter SVARs so far. For these reasons, I stick to the
use of a constant parameter SVAR and restrict the analysis to the post GFC period, to limit the
possibility of a structural change in the parameters.
3.3 Identification strategy
To identify the structural shocks wi, I employ a combination of zero restrictions and traditional
sign restrictions on the impulse response functions as well as developed Narrative sign restrictions
on the structural shocks and on the historical decompositions. In particular, I identify a QE term
premium shock, a QE signalling shock, a Risk shock, a Supply shock, and a Demand shock. Even
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though I am not directly interested in the Risk, Supply, and Demand shocks, it is acknowledged
that adding plausible restrictions to identify other shocks helps pin down the ones of interest
(Canova & Paustian (2011), Kilian & Murphy (2012)).
The first identification scheme I study is the following:
Table 1: Identification scheme I
QE
premium
QE
signalling
Risk Supply Demand
κ - with N 0 - ? -
exp 0 - ? ? ?
b + + 0 ? ?
p 0 0 ? - +
y 0 0 ? + +
? Means no restriction is imposed
N stands for (developed) Narrative sign restrictions
In this setting, a QE term premium shock is a shock that lowers the term premium in the
context of an announcement of a purchase of bonds by the central bank. That shock leaves the
terminal rate unchanged to capture the fact that this pure QE term premium shock should not
affect interest rate expectations if the central bank has orthogonalized the two yield curve channels
of QE. In addition, the impact of the QE term premium shock on the macro variables is set to
zero on impact, to capture both its qualitative and quantitative impact on the economy. The usual
reasonable assumption that macroeconomic variables can only respond with a lag to a monetary
policy shock is made. Furthermore, a pure QE signalling shock is a shock that decreases the termi-
nal rate in the context of an announcement of a purchase of bonds by the central bank. It should
also not impact the term premium and macroeconomic variables are only allowed to respond with
a lag. Besides, a (negative) Risk shock is a shock that moves the term premium (i.e, the reward
for bearing risk) down, where that movement is not due to a QE programme. The identification of
this shock is crucial to separate movements of the term premium that are due to QE and those due
to market movements (flight-to-safety, risk, etc.). Then, a standard Supply shock is identified and
its impact on the policy variables is left unrestricted. Indeed, the reaction of the central bank to
that type of shock depends on its loss function regarding the real GDP-inflation trade-off. Finally,
a Demand shock is expansionary for real GDP, prices and it also leads to a reduction in the term
premium as risk shrinks18 (Ho¨rdahl, Remonola & Valente (2015)).19 Details of the identification
with traditional sign restrictions and zero restrictions are provided in Appendix B.1.1 and B.1.2.
However, from this set of restrictions one could wonder whether strict identification is achieved
between the Risk shock and the two QE shocks. The answer is yes: the probability to ”draw a
zero” when the restriction is positive or negative is exactly zero. Indeed, over an infinite number
of possibilities within the set of real numbers R, there is no chance to draw a specific value. In this
setting, shocks are therefore set identified. Nevertheless, I couple the traditional sign restrictions
with exclusive Narrative sign restrictions to sharpen the identification of the QE term premium
shock. The Narrative sign restrictions approach was developed by Antol´ın-Dı´az & Rubio-Ramı´rez
18Note that remaining agnostic on the response of the term premium only shortens the positive response of real
GDP.
19The authors show using events-studies that a positive announcement on the state of the economy leads to a
reduction of the risk premium.
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(2018) and has since become very popular. This cutting-edge identification strategy helps pin
down structural shocks using prior Narrative information. In this paper, I develop the Narrative
sign restrictions approach beyond the framework given by the authors and I label them developed
Narrative sign restrictions. Then, I use these type of restriction to identify the QE term premium
shock by setting restrictions at key announcement dates of the PSPP by the ECB. In particular, I
focus on major events and study their impact on the term premium using daily data (see Figure 2).
I impose a restriction on the sign of the QE term premium shock and on the amplitude of
its contribution to the Historical Decomposition (HD) of the term premium at key dates. In An-
tol´ın-Dı´az & Rubio-Ramı´rez language, these are respectively referred to as Class I and Class
II restrictions. Still, I innovate by also adding restrictions on the relative amplitude of the QE
term premium shock with respect to other shocks and with respect to itself during the rest of
the sample. I also impose a restriction on the sign of the contribution of the QE term premium
shock to the HD of the term premiumn. Useful to sharpen the identification, I name these types
of restrictions developed Narrative sign restrictions. A Summary of the restrictions employed is
detailed in Table 3. Mathematical expressions of the developed Narrative sign restrictions are
available in Appendix B.1.3. For a treatment of the traditional sign restrictions approach on
the IRFs, see for example Chapter 13 of Kilian & Lu¨tkepohl (2016).
Let us now focus on the key dates related to the PSPP presented on Table 2, for which
imposing developed Narrative sign restrictions may be relevant. Note that I ignore announcements
related to the CSPP programme, that could have impacted the sovereign yield curve via spillover
effects. This decision is justified by the fact that I want to focus on the direct effects of the PSPP
only. In order to find out which of these announcements related to the QE programme had a
substantial impact on the term premium of government bonds, I plot the latter on Figure 2 at a
daily frequency during the months of the announcements. Similar plots for the terminal rate and
the 10-year yield are presented on Figure 19 and Figure 20 - Appendix A.5.
Table 2: PSPP-related events
Dates Event
22/08/2014 Draghi Jackson Hole Speech
22/01/2015 Announcement of the Expanded APP
09/03/2015 Start and release of implementation details of APP
03/09/2015 Increase in PSPP issue share limit
10/03/2016 PSPP amount raised and CSPP announced
08/12/2016 PSPP recalibration
19/01/2017 Extension of the PSPP below the DFR
26/10/2017 PSPP recalibration
14/06/2018 PSPP recalibration
APP stands for Asset Purchase Programme
PSPP stands for Public Sector Purchase Programme
CSPP stands for Corporate Sector Purchase Programme
DFR stands for Deposit Facility rate
Source : ECB Press Release
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Figure 2: Daily 10Y term premium during months of key announcements
10Y term premium in the month of the major QE-related announcements
Red vertical bar corresponds to announcement
Strikingly, January 22nd and March 9th, 2015 were major events that moved the term premium
significantly. On the former date, the APP programme was introduced and on the latter it was
implemented (with a release of important details). Besides, March 10th, 2016 also seems to be a
relevant date that contributed to an upward movement of the term premium. On that date, mar-
ket went reverse as participants were disappointed by the policy rate cut coupled with the PSPP
recalibration (monthly APP purchases increased to e80bn and introduction of the CSPP).20 As
a consequence, the term premium went up, which could be assimilated to a negative QE shock.
However, it is not clear that this event was the main market mover of the month. So it is not for the
other dates studied. Especially, some researchers (for example Middeldorp (2015) and De Santis
(2016)), believe that QE was very much anticipated by market participants so much so that the
actual announcement date could be placed in August 2014, following President Draghi’s Jackson
Hole speech (Garcia Pascual & Wieladek (2016)). However, once again it is here not clear that this
event was an obvious market mover for the term premium, even though it may have contributed to
its global downward trend around that period. Therefore, I will only use January 22nd and March
9th, 2015 as dates to impose developed Narrative sign restrictions. Unfortunately for my identifying
scheme, other news came out during the months related to the QE announcements. For example,
January 22nd, 2015 also corresponds to an announcement related to the LTRO programme. One
could then wonder whether I identify a pure QE shock and not a more global unconventional
monetary policy shock. However, the fact that the QE shock is conditioned on an announced
amount of bonds to be purchased to go up thanks to a traditional sign restriction, guarantees the
identification of a pure QE term premium shock. Overall, the choice of January 22nd and March
9th, 2015 is in line with Andrade et al. (2016) and Dedola et al. (2017),21 that find a statistically
significant impact on asset prices at these dates.
20http://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2016/mar/10/ecb-stimulus-measures-mario-draghi-
negative-rates-qe-business-live
21See Appendix B, table 1 in particular.
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Eventually, the developed Narrative sign restrictions imposed are the following:
Table 3: Developed Narrative sign restrictions
Dates Restrictions
22/01/2015
QE shock is positive, its amplitude is higher than other shocks
at this date and the highest QE shock of the sample. Its
contribution to the HD of the term premium is negative and
higher than the contribution of the other shocks.
09/03/2015
QE shock is positive and its contribution to the HD of the term
premium is negative.
3.4 Data and estimation
I estimate the SVAR model with 12 lags and a constant on monthly data ranging from January
2009 to December 2018. The idea is to focus on the post-GFC period, which also corresponds to
the introduction of unconventional monetary policies. Economic activity is the log-real GDP22
interpolated at a monthly frequency using a Denton approach and the OECD Composite leading
indicator (CLI) as an index.23 Price index is the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP).24
Finally, I build a market-consistent series of amount of bonds announced to be purchased monthly
through the APP programme on Figure 3. That is, the official amount of bonds purchased
is adjusted to be placed at the date of announcement (versus implementation) and the size is
corrected with respect to market reactions to the press release to capture surprises. Especially, I
take a look at the impact of the press releases25 on the 10-year German yield (Bund) using the
database from Altavilla et al. (2019) and adjust the size of the APP to be purchased accordingly.26
Thus, I ensure that dates such as March 9th, 2015 actually correspond to an increase in the series
as markets reacted positively to the announcement (the Bund went down), even though the size of
the programme did not changed in reality. On the opposite, market participants were disappointed
by the amplitude of the extension of the APP programme on December 8th, 2016. It therefore
now corresponds to a decrease in the perceived APP purchase.
22Data are available at: http://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CLVMEURSCAB1GQEA19
23Data are available at: http://data.oecd.org/leadind/composite-leading-indicator-cli.htm
24Data are available at: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu
25Press realeses can be found here http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2019/html/index.en.html
26The adjusted size is negatively proportional to the change in the 10Y German yield.
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Figure 3: APP purchase
Vertical bars corresponds to the announcements
Numbers correspond to the change in bps in the Bund 45 min around the press conference
Moreover, the SVAR is estimated using Bayesian methods with standard natural conjugate
(Normal-Wishart) priors following the most efficient algorithm currently available: the one of
Arias, Rubio-Ramirez & Waggoner (2018). In this algorithm, coefficients are drawn from a con-
jugate uniform-normal-inverse-Wishart posterior distribution over the orthogonal reduced-form
parametrization and then transformed into a structural parametrization. This transformation in-
duces a normal-generalized-normal posterior distribution over the structural parameterization. It
requires the use of an important sampler to re-weight the successful draws in the presence of zero
restrictions. Similarly, the use of Narrative sign restriction truncates the support of the likelihood
function and therefore requires a re-weighting of the likelihood. To the best of my knowledge, this
paper is the first to combine zero restrictions, traditional sign restrictions and (developed) Nar-
rative sign restrictions, thus providing the sharpest possible identification scheme while beating a
technical challenge. Details of the Bayesian estimation are provided in Appendix B.2.
3.5 The term premium as a monetary policy instrument
To analyze the impact of the structural shocks on the endogenous variables following identifi-
cation scheme I, I compute the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) on Figure 4, using the fact
that:
Υt+h =
∞∑
q=0
CqL
qit+h =
∞∑
q=0
Cq
i
t+h−q =
∞∑
q=0
Cqbiw
i
t+h−q (26)
where Υt =
∞∑
q=0
CqL
qt = [Φ(L)]
−1t is the Wold decomposition, bi is the ith column of B, and wt
is the vector of structural shocks from Equation (24).
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Figure 4: Point-wise median Impulse Response Functions - Identification Scheme I
In particular, shocks are calibrated to be of one standard deviation (structural shocks are pre-
sented on Figure 23 - Appendix B.4). I present the point-wise median and the 68% confidence
interval response of each variables to all shocks. Nonetheless, I acknowledge the drawbacks of bas-
ing an analysis on such a reductive statistics as highlighted by Kilian & Inoue (2013). Therefore,
I also compute the Fry & Pagan (2011) median target response and the confidence bands quantile
targets on Figure 24 - Appendix B.4. Overall, this robustness check shows that there is very
little difference in the statistics response displayed.27 Especially, a decrease in the 10-year term
premium of about 0.075%, coupled with an announcement of a e 5 billion of monthly purchase,
gradually raises prices to a peak of about 0.1 and increases log-real GDP by about 7.5x10−4 af-
ter three years. For comparison, this means that assuming linearity, a 1% decrease in the term
premium, requiring the announcement of a e 66 billion monthly purchase, would lead the price
level to jump by about 1.3 point and real GDP by about 13.3 point. Besides, it is worth noting
that the increase in macro variables is quite gradual, potentially reflecting a certain high degree of
price rigidity and a slow transmission mechanism through the credit channel. Interestingly, that
improvement in the economy is combined with a slight decrease in the terminal rate, indicating
that there might remain a trace of the signalling channel present in the data despite the orthogo-
nalization of the shocks.
Besides, a QE signalling shock that decreases the terminal rate by 0.05%, raises prices slightly
less and real GDP slightly more than the QE term premium shock. Equivalently, a 1% decrease
in the terminal rate, coupled with an announcement of a e 40 billion monthly purchase, leads to
a hike of 1 in the price level and about 20 in real GDP. There is however no clear impact on the
term premium, as expected by the orthogonalization.
Otherwise, a negative Risk shock decreases both the term premium and the terminal rate as
confidence increases. More interestingly, it leads to an adverse effect on prices (that go down) and
real GDP (that go up). I conjecture that the extra confidence mostly concerns firms rather that
household consumers. That is, a decrease in the long-term yield components not driven by mon-
etary policy is a gain in confidence by firms that decide to increase investment. On the contrary,
households’ confidence is not so much impacted by a long-term rate drop and don’t change their
27Responses are based on 10,000 successful draws of which 6,117 are unique after re-weighting.
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consumption habit. As a consequence, demand remains stable but production increases: real GDP
goes up and prices go down.
Moreover, Demand and Supply shocks have a much more transitory impact on inflation: the
effect dies out after a year. On the other hand, most of the increase in real GDP arises on impact
and seems to be permanent. Both responses are of the same order of magnitude as the one stan-
dard deviation QE shocks, confirming the credibility of the previous results. However, this does
not mean that Macro and QE shocks contributed to output and prices in the same proportion, as
it will be shown on the historical decompositions. Finally, the Supply shock does not significantly
move the term premium and terminal rate, while the Demand shock decreases both. Indeed, this
improvement in the economy is accompanied with an increase in confidence and investment that
pushes long-term rates down.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the results are broadly robust to changes in the prior tight-
ness, the number of lags, the inclusion or exclusion of the exogenous variables and the removal of
Narrative sign restrictions.
I now study the case in which the central bank has not orthogonalized the term premium
and signalling channels of QE in Table 4. Thus, the contemporaneous and endogenous response
of market participants to each of the QE shocks is taken into account. In this setting, a QE term
premium shock now leads market participants to revise their expectations about the terminal rate
upward, inferring a future hawkish move from the central bank. Plus, a QE signalling shock now
lowers the term premium, as risk shrinks due to a better expected economic outlook.
Table 4: Identification scheme II
QE
premium
QE
signalling
Risk Supply Demand
κ - - - ? -
exp + - ? ? ?
b + + 0 ? ?
p + + ? - +
y + + ? + +
? Means no restriction is imposed
N stands for (developed) Narrative sign restrictions
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Figure 5: Point-wise median Impulse Response Functions - Identification Scheme II
Identification scheme II shows that the QE term premium shock still fosters prices and real
GDP, but the impact on real activity is now much more transitory. The positive effect dies out
after a year as a result of higher interest rate expectations. Moreover, the peak impact on prices
averages 0.05 points, whereas it reached 0.1 in the first identification scheme. On the other hand,
the impact of the signalling channel is stronger in this second identification scheme, as the decrease
in the terminal rate is accompanied by a reduction in the term premium. This raises real GDP
more (1x10−3 versus 4x10−4), while the response of prices remains broadly similar.
Overall, a first overview shows that these results confirm previous studies about the positive
impact of QE on the Euro Area economy (Bundesbank Report (2016), Garcia Pascual & Wieladek
(2016), Gambetti & Musso (2017), Mouabbi & Sahuc (2018), and ECB Economic Bulletin (2019)).
Yet, the most important takeaway is that orthogonalizing the yield curve channels of QE is mean-
ingful and can have a positive impact on the amplitude of the response of the macroeconomic
variables. Indeed, Identification Scheme II shows that the signalling channel can phagocyte the
effects of the term premium channel if those are not fully orthogonalized. In addition, the IRFs
of prices and real GDP clearly show that the term premium can be used as a monetary policy
instrument to foster the economy, to the extent that the central bank is capable to control it. Still,
as soon as the monetary institution credibly states that there is no link to be inferred on the level
of the policy rates from QE, the signalling channel will freeze and QE will enable the central bank
to control the term premium uniquely.
Additionally, if controlling the term premium arises in the context of QE, that is of non-sterilized
asset purchase, it might very well be the case that sterilized asset purchase such as the Opera-
tion Twist in the U.S or even the (never implemented) Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT)
or Securities Market Program (SMP) in the Euro Area could be sufficient to give control of the
term premium. Whether the institution should keep the size of its balance sheet constant or not
following market interventions is up to other considerations such as the rate of growth of money,
the level of inflation, and the liquidity of financial markets. Unfortunately, the framework of this
paper does not allow to give a stance on the effects of non-sterilized asset purchases on the economy.
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While the previous IRFs enable to observe the hypothetical propagation of shocks, histori-
cal decompositions provide a historical perspective to the analysis, by showing the contribution
of all shocks in driving the variables over the sample period. Thus, I produce the median target
historical decomposition of real GDP and prices on Figure 6 and 7. HDs of the term premium
and terminal rate are presented on Figure 25 and 26 in Appendix B.4. To do so, I use:
Hj,wi,ts = e
′
j
ts−1∑
q=0
Cqbiw
i
ts−q (27)
where Hj,wi,ts is the HD of variable j for a shock on w
i at time ts and ej is the j
th column of I5
Figure 6: Historical Decomposition of real GDP - Identification Scheme I
Historical decomposition is expressed in deviation from initial conditions
Solid grey area corresponds to a recession period as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
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Figure 7: Historical Decomposition of Prices - Identification Scheme I
Historical decomposition is expressed in deviation from initial conditions
Solid grey area corresponds to a recession period as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
The first thing that comes to sight when taking a look at the HD of real GDP is the prominence
of the role of the Supply and Demand shocks as drivers of real Economic activity. Especially, the
addition of the contributions of these two shocks astonishingly dominates between mid 2011 and
2017, whereas the contributions of the QE shocks are comparatively negligible until mid 2016.
From there on however, the positive contribution of the QE term premium shock becomes mean-
ingful and gradually grows until the end of the sample. That is, about three quarters after the
announcement of the QE programme and two quarters after its implementation, real GDP starts
being positively driven by the reduction in the term premium. On the other hand, the signalling
channel played no role at all after 2016. Nevertheless, during 2012-2015 real GDP has seen a slight
positive contribution of the QE signalling channel and a negative contribution of the QE term
premium channel. I refer to this as the whatever it takes period, in reference to the famous phrase
pronounced by Mario Draghi in London on July 26th, 2012. That is, Draghi’s commitment and
threat of the OMT programme is somehow captured in my identification scheme and has had a
positive effect on real activity via a reduction in interest rate expectations. As a contrary, deep
turmoil on periphery sovereign debts added to tensions linked to a late QE programme weighted
down on real GDP. The takeaway from this chart is that only the term premium channel of QE
played a significant role in increasing real GDP. Also, this role came with a lag of three to six
months, consistent with economic theory. Indeed, the domino effect of the portfolio balance mech-
anism from sovereign bonds to financing the real economy does need a few months to arise.
Turning to the decomposition of consumer prices, it is noteworthy that shocks related to the
term premium played a big role over the sample, whether through the Risk or QE shocks. Along-
side, the Supply and Demand shocks played little role in driving prices between 2009 and 2018, a
period marked with a higher volatility of the price level (Stdev. of 0.63 for 2004-2008 and 0.96 for
2009-2018), much of it being driven by the Risk shock. In addition, as for real GDP, the positive
contribution of the QE signalling shock from mid 2012 to mid 2014 is probably also due to the
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whatever it takes period, in the sens that lower interest rate expectations must have raised inflation
expectations and therefore prices. Besides, the amplitude of the term premium and signalling QE
shocks surge from mid 2014, when QE started being anticipated by the markets (especially after
Draghi speech at Jackson Hole in August 2014). However, the sum of the contribution of the QE
shocks was negative between 2014 and 2017. It therefore means that during 2015Q3-2017, a the
reduction in interest rate expectations and term premia had a positive effect on real GDP but a
contractionary impact on consumer prices. From 2017 to 2019 yet, QE shocks’ contributions to
prices revert and follow the ones of real GDP, encouraging the rise in prices. Thus, it seems that
the initial response of prices to QE is puzzling and in contradiction to Economic theory at first
glance.
To test the robustness of this price puzzle, I next conduct a counterfactual analysis as it is
often the case when evaluating the impact of QE (Kapetanios et al. (2012), Baumeister & Benati
(2013) among others). That is, I calculate the values of real GDP and of the price level, had QE
not been implemented through the term premium channel. However, I depart from the quoted
studies as I compute shock-specific conditional forecasts in addition to the usual shock shut-down
in the historical decompositions. Especially, I assume that the conditional forecasts of real GDP
and prices are generated by the QE term premium shock only, so as to fully isolate the term pre-
mium channel. To do so, I rely on the method developed by Dieppe, Legrand & Van Roye (2016).
In particular, I conduct an in-sample forecasting exercise from January 2015 to December 2018
to capture the entire period of the QE programme. Based on the SRTSM estimated at a daily
frequency, I estimate that the amplitude of the impact of the announcement of the QE programme
on January 22nd, 2015 on the term premium lasted until February 2nd, 2015. Past that date, the
downward impact started reverting. More precisely, I find that the 10-year AAA Euro Area term
premium fell by about 25 basis points between these dates (see Figure 22 - Appendix A.5). In
addition, Figure 21 - Appendix A.5 shows that most of the drop in the yield curves arose from
the drop in the term premium; the expectation curve being stuck at the ELB. This is in line with
Figure 19 and 20 in Appendix A.5, that show the amplitude of the drop in the term premium,
terminal rate, and 10-year yield following the QE-related events.
Ultimately, I plot the forecasts of the macroeconomic variables on Figure 8 on the counterfactual
that the term premium had not fallen by 25 basis points as a result of the QE term premium
shock, using:
Υt+h = Υ˜t+h +
h∑
q=1
Ch−qBwt+q (28)
where Υt+h is the conditional forecast of Υ at time t = t+ h and
Υ˜t+h =
p∑
q=1
Z(h)q Υt−q+1
is the unconditional forecast at time t = t+h, with Z
(h)
q products of Zk and B that can be obtained
recursively.
Details regarding the derivation of the posterior distribution to produce conditional forecasts gen-
erated by a specific shock are presented in Appendix B.3
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Figure 8: Conditional Forecasts - Identification Scheme I
Solid black line shows the data
Doted-blue line is the point-wise median counterfactual with the confidence interval
The conditional forecasting exercise of Figure 8 broadly confirms the analysis of the histori-
cal decompositions: the term premium channel of QE fostered real GDP (by about 1 point as of
2018M12), but weighted down on prices in 2016. However, note that the counterfactual forecast
shows an increase in prices between 2015 and 2016, as opposed to the historical decomposition.
This is potentially due to the difference in the draw analysed (median target v.s. point-wise me-
dian), but this may also indicate that a the source of the price puzzle only appeared with a lag.
As a robustness check, counterfactual prices and real GDP originating from the HDs are presented
on Figure 28 and Figure 27 - Appendix B.4. Overall, they show that prices would have been
slightly higher without the QE term premium shock until mid 2016 and lower afterwards, while
real GDP would have been on average lower by 1 point over the period.
Finally, the initial adverse effect of the term premium channel on real GDP and prices is
confirmed by the scatter plot of the macroeconomic variables conditional of the QE shocks, dis-
played on Figure 9. Indeed, this scatter plot clearly shows that there has been a trade-off between
the two variables in 2014-2016 conditional on the term premium channel, as shown by the negative
(-93.77) slope of the light blue regression line in the top right-hand corner plot. However, this
trade-off disappears right before 2017 and the term premium channel of QE is then able to foster
both prices and real GDP at the same time (the red regression line displays a big positive slope
of 247.84). Moreover, the positive relation of the second part of the QE period actually counter-
balances the early sample trade-off when the whole QE period is considered (black line). This
confirms the hypothesis of a temporary price puzzle, rather than a well rooted effect. In addition,
the data scatter plot shows that the unconditional correlation has been upward slopping over the
period, indicating that the trade-off is only conditional on the QE term premium shock. This is
consistent with the theoretical framework of a Phillips Curve, where a higher output comes at
the cost of a higher inflation. Besides, the absence of any trade-off conditional on the signalling
channel of QE corroborates the HD displaying a marginal impact of interest rate expectations on
real GDP through the programme.
26
Figure 9: Scatter Plot - Identification Scheme I
Scatter plot from 2014:M01 to 2018:M12
If the previous exercises confirm the presence of a temporary prize puzzle in the transmission
of QE through the term premium channel, they however remain silent on its origin. Plus, the B-
SVAR framework employed relies on a structural interpretation of the shocks hitting the economy
and does not allow for any potential time-variation in its parameters. These issues are addressed
in the next section, using reduced-form regressions with time-varying coefficients as well as a
DCC-GARCH model.
4 Cost-channel of QE
There has been a vast literature trying to solve empirical price puzzles of monetary policy,
starting with Sims (1992). I am however the first, to the best of my knowledge, to shed light on a
price puzzle in the transmission mechanism of QE in the Euro Area. To highlight the transmission
channel of the term premium to the consumer price level, I conduct three reduced-form regressions
with time-varying parameters featuring the dynamics of the cost of capital for firms, producer
price inflation, and consumer price inflation. I am therefore able to capture any potential time
variation in the functioning of the term premium channel, while remaining agnostic vis-a-vis the
shocks driving the economy.
First, the cost of borrowing dynamics is:
rKt = ωtr
K
t−1 + ψtEt[rt+10Y ] + φtκt + 1,t (29)
where the corporate cost of borrowing for long-term loans rKt is a function of its own lag as well as
the (10-year) terminal rate Et[rt+10Y ] and the 10-year term premium κt. This framework relies on
the assumption that corporate loan rates are mostly driven by the 10-year sovereign yield, which
is a reasonable hypothesis as long as one believes that investment is funded by long-term loans
rather than short-term. It enables to quantify the contribution of the yield components to the cost
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of borrowing.
Second, Producer Price Inflation (PPI) dynamics is:
piPPIt = µtpi
PPI
t−1 + αtpi
wages
t + βtr
K
t−1 + γtpi
energy
t + ζtpi
import
t + 1,t (30)
where the industrial PPI inflation (excluding construction) piPPIt is a function of its own lag, wage
inflation (based on compensation per employee) piwagest , the cost of borrowing for corporations a
quarter before rKt−1, energy price inflation (based on HICP energy) pi
energy
t , and imported inflation
(excluding construction and energy) piimportt . This setting will capture the importance of the term
premium in driving PPI inflation.
Finally, Consumer Price Inflation (CPI) dynamics is:
piCPIt = ρtpi
CPI
t−1 + (1− ρt)Et[piCPIt+1 ] + θtpiPPIt−1 + ηtrKt−1 + 3,t (31)
where the CPI inflation (HICP) piCPIt is driven by its own lag, the one quarter ahead consumer
price inflation expectation from ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters Et[pi
CPI
t+1 ],
28 by PPI in-
flation piPPIt−1 , and the cost of borrowing for corporations a quarter before r
K
t−1. Hence, should a
reduction of the term premium weight down on CPI inflation through a cost-channel, ηt would be
positive.
Besides, time-varying coefficients (ωt, ψt, φt, µt, αt, βt, γt, ζt, ρt, θt, ηt) ∈ R are constrained random
walks (0 < ωt, µt, ρt < 1 and ψt, φt, αt, γt, ζt, θt > 0), while i,t
iid∼ N (0, σ2i ) are the residuals. Equa-
tion (29), (30), and (31) are estimated via maximum a posteriori through the extended Kalman
Filter from 2004Q4 to 2018Q4 using quarterly data. Three-year length rolling window OLS re-
gressions estimates serve as prior to guide the filter. Estimates of time-varying coefficients β, η,
and φ are presented on Figure 10. Of course, an obvious criticism is that one could see the three
equations as linked and that they should be derived from a micro-founded model. I acknowledge
this point but stress the fact that the exercise is deliberately left reduced-form so as to add to the
structural analysis conducted in Section 3.2.
28Data are available at: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu
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Figure 10: Cost channel
Sample period: 2004Q9-2018Q4
Solid grey area corresponds to a recession period as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
Strikingly, the role of the term premium in the dynamics of the cost of borrowing for corpora-
tions, φ, surged during GFC, jumping from zero to stabilize at around 0.15 in the QE period. This
is in line with the unconventional monetary policies implemented in that period, where the central
bank tried to act on firms financing conditions through long-term yields. Besides, this hypothesis
is strengthen by the conditional covariance plotted on Figure 29 - Appendix C.1. Extracted
from a Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC)-GARCH model based on Engle (2002) (details of
the model are presented in Appendix C), the covariance between the term premium and the cost
of borrowing hiked during GFC and since the start of the QE programme. It is positive between
2015 and 2019, indicating that the reduction in the cost of borrowing was also associated with a
reduction in the term premium. This confirms the role of QE on firms financing.
More interestingly, if the role of the cost of capital in driving PPI inflation, β, plotted on Fig-
ure 10 is positive throughout the sample and increased by about 25% since GFC, the contribution
to CPI inflation, η, switches sign twice. This means that the decreasing cost of borrowing observed
on Figure 31 - Appendix D since mid 2014, contributed to the drop in PPI inflation between
2012Q3 to 2016Q1. However, this contraction in the cost of borrowing alternatively pushed CPI
inflation up and down. The relationship is indeed slightly positive in 2009-2012 and 2014-2018,
implying that a lower cost of borrowing caused a lower CPI inflation. This is in contradiction with
economic theory, which says that an interest rate cut should foster demand, therefore production
and consumer prices. Instead, results provide evidence that the reduction in the cost of capital
provoked by a decrease in the term premium has enabled producers to temporarily reduce selling
prices. They would do so in order to gain in market share, while preserving their margins thanks
to the diminution of the cost of production (PPI inflation here). This price puzzle is thus most
probably solved through the cost channel developed by Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (1996),
Barth & Ramey (2002), Ravenna & Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury, Hoffmann & Schabert (2006)
among others. Especially, the cost channel of monetary policy focuses on the supply (cost-push)
effects of a monetary policy shock. Not denying the demand-induced effect of an interest rate cut,
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cost channel theory sheds light on the role of the cost of capital in the marginal cost of production
determining firms’ prices. That is, assuming that firms have to borrow in advance to finance cap-
ital and labor, a decrease in the cost of capital caused by a monetary policy easing lowers firms
marginal cost of production. Then, some of those firms are able to lower selling prices in order to
gain in market share: CPI goes down, implying a strong counter-cyclicality of price mark-ups.29
After a certain period depending on price rigidity and the price-demand elasticity, demand goes
up following the prices cut and CPI inflation starts picking up again.
In this paper, evidence from the B-SVAR of Section 3.2 shows that the term premium channel
of QE has contributed negatively to consumer prices between 2015 and 2017, after which the sign
of the effect reverts. In addition, evidence from the regressions with time-varying coefficients show
that the role of the cost of borrowing in the dynamics of CPI inflation has been positive since
2014. This validates the story of a cost-channel of working capital in the transmission of QE to
the economy, that disappeared with a rising demand around 2017. Why the role of cost of capital
in driving consumer prices switches sign throughout the sample can be explained by the net cash
position of firms, working capital requirements, menu costs as well as the degree of competition in
specific market segments. Put differently, it is not surprising that the sign and amplitude of the
cost of borrowing-CPI inflation relationship, η, is time-varying, as the amplitude of the demand-
induced versus the supply-side effects of monetary policy may not be constant. Eventually, the
sign is determined by the dominance of one of these two effects. This finding provides a new ex-
planation to why inflation has been so muted between 2015 and 2017, despite the easing monetary
environment. If the negative contribution of energy inflation has often been highlighted (ECB
Economic Bulletin (2019)), it is quite plausible that a cost channel effect has also contributed to
slow prices growth down during that period.
Before closing this section, I introduce the concept of cost of capital pass-through to quan-
tify the cost channel effect revealed here. In particular, I compute the ratio of the elasticity of CPI
inflation with respect to the cost of borrowing, η, to the elasticity of PPI inflation with respect to
the cost of borrowing, β. Thus, a positive pass-through implies the presence of the cost channel
and the higher the pass-through, the stronger the cost channel. It therefore measures the ability of
producers to reset prices when marginal cost of production goes down. It is presented on Figure
11. As of December 2018, the pass-through reached 0.16, implying that a one-percent drop in the
cost of borrowing would imply a decrease in CPI inflation by 0.16 of the drop in PPI inflation. It
started rising about a year before the introduction of the QE programme, when term premia were
pushed down by anticipations. The fact that the pass-through is also positive between 2009 and
2012 may be attributed to the sharp decrease in yields initiated by policy rate cuts after GFC.
29The literature lacks recent study on the conditional cyclicality of price mark-ups in the Euro area. For a recent
paper on the U.S. see Nekarda & Ramey (2019).
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Figure 11: Cost of capital pass-through
Sample period: 2004Q9-2018Q4
Solid grey area corresponds to a recession period as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
5 Policy rule for the term premium
Now that I have shown that the term premium can be used as a monetary policy instrument
and that I have quantified its impact on prices and real GDP, I compute a policy rule for the
term premium to serve as a base thought to design a governing rule for Quantitative Easing. In
particular, to see if there is a parameter instability in the contingent relation, I estimate both a
constant and a time-varying parameter version of the following rule:
κt = ρtκt−1 + (1− ρt)(τpi,tpigapt + τy,tygapt + τr,trt) (32)
where κt is the 10-year term premium, pi
gap
t is annualized CPI inflation minus the inflation target
(2%), ygapt is the detrended log-real GDP growth using an HP-Filter, and rt is the 3-month Euro
Area interest rate minus the one quarter ahead annualized inflation expectation from ECB SPF.30
Besides, 0 < ρt < 1 and (τpi,t, τy,t, τκ,t) ∈ R are random walks. Constant parameter version of
Equation (32) is estimated via maximum likelihood, while the time-varying version is estimated
via maximum a posteriori through the extented Kalman Filter using OLS estimates as priors to
guide the filter.
30Interpolated at the monthly frequency using a Quadratic approach matching average.
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Table 5: Constant parameter Policy rule for the term premium
LLH RMSE ρ τpi τy τr
-92 0.11 0.982*** 0.950* -2.525* -0.887**
(0.009) (0.555) (1.31) (0.389)
Sample period: 2009M01-2018M12
Standard errors are indicated in parentheses
LLH is the Log-Likelihood
RMSE is the Root Mean Squared Error
* Rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient equal to zero at 10%
** Rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient equal to zero at 5%
*** Rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient equal to zero at 1%
Figure 12: Time-varying parameter Policy rule for the term premium
Sample: 2009:M1-2018:M12
LLH=59 - RMSE=0.11
Solid grey areas correspond to recession periods as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
In the constant-parameter regression presented in Table 5, all coefficients are statistically
significant at 10% and the fit is relatively good (RMSE=0.11). Besides, the sign of the coefficients
τpi,t, τy,t, and τκ,t is worth commenting. First, it seems that over the period considered, inflation
feedback to the term premium was positive, as it would be in a conventional Taylor rule. Thus,
the term premium responded positively to a rise in inflation but slightly lower than one-to-one.
Yet, taking a look at the potential time-variation in that coefficient on Figure 12 shows that the
strength of the feedback decreased over the sample, with the exception of the QE shock episodes in
January and March 2015. Second, the output gap coefficient is strongly negative, averaging -2.5 as
displayed in Table 5. However, a quick look at Figure 12 reveals that the negativity is actually
driven by the non-stable first part of the sample (GFC). Aside from that, the feedback is positive
and stabilizes at about 1.3 in December 2018, implying that the term premium responded more
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than one-to-one to an increase in the output gap.31 Finally, the negative sign of τr for most part of
the sample means that the term premium responded adversely to monetary policy shocks, implying
that market participants tended to revise their perception of risk, inferring an improvement in the
economy from a policy rate hike.
Of course, the micro-foundation and determinacy of such a rule is unexplored here. This would
require a rich model, that is beyond the scope of that paper. However, this purely reduced-form
exercise sheds light on the relevance of a policy rule for the term premium and lays the ground for
future research.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I quantify the effects of the ECB PSPP programme on the Eurozone economy
through the yield curve channels and show that the term premium can be used as a single monetary
policy instrument. My motivation for this study lies in the fact that it has been found in the
literature that QE mostly impacts the term premium component of long-term yields, relative to
short-term interest rate expectations. However, this term premium channel of QE to the economy
had never been properly isolated and studied. Plus, practitioner’s view that a decline in the
term premium is expansionary for economic activity is not backed by the existing literature, both
theoretical and empirical, that struggles to capture the impact of a change in the term premium
on macroeconomic aggregates. This paper contributes to fill this gap in the literature.
To capture the macroeconomic implications of the ECB QE programme, both through the
signalling and term premium channels, I first extract a term premium and terminal rate series
from a shadow rate term structure model with anchored interest rate expectations. I then plug the
two yield components into a monthly Bayesian Structural VAR with the price level, real GDP, and
a series of market-consistent PSPP purchase. I next identify a pure QE signalling and QE term
premium shock thanks to zero restrictions, sign restrictions, and Narrative sign restrictions that
I develop beyond the framework given by their authors. With this set-up, I show that the term
premium channel of QE had a positive impact on real GDP with a lag of three quarters, while the
signalling channel played little role. In addition, I show that both the signalling and term premium
channels contributed negatively to consumer prices in 2015-2017 and positively afterwards. Indeed,
I later expose, using a DCC-GARCH model and time-varying coefficient regressions, that there
has been a cost channel in the transmission mechanism of QE to inflation. That is, the decrease
in firms’ cost of borrowing associated to lower term premia, allowed producers to cut selling prices
so as to gain in market share. Assuming firms have to borrow in advance to finance capital and
labor, this cost channel of QE provides a new explanation as to why inflation has been so muted
between 2015 and 2017, despite the easing monetary environment.
Above all, in this paper I shed light on the benefits of using the term premium as a monetary
policy instrument. In particular, I argue that in addition to giving the central bank a new policy
instrument and to strengthen the impact of QE, it would also enable the monetary institution to
shape the long-end of the yield curve. This may be desirable in the context of a yield curve control
policy or simply to steepen the yield curve in order to restore bank margins. Thus, I explain how
the central bank could directly control the term premium by neutralizing the signalling channel of
QE. Briefly, the central bank would just need to dissociate interest rate expectations from asset
purchase by credibly stating that it is ready to conduct QE- whatever the level of the policy rates.
Hence, market participants will not infer from the introduction of a QE programme that the central
bank will keep the policy rates low for a long period. The monetary institution will therefore be
able to shape the long-end of the yield curve by acting on its term premium only. Besides, as it
31Of course, an obvious flaw in this exercise is the measure of output gap, simply inferred from filtering real GDP
growth.
33
can shrink the term premium through QE, the central bank could also very well raise it through
Quantitative Tightening (QT), if necessary to match the long-end of the curve with a target.
Finally, like a Taylor rule for the short-term interest rate, a policy rule for the term premium
could be a major ingredient in the composition of a governing rule for asset purchase-and-sale.
Here, I lay the groundwork to find one by estimating a constant as well as a time-varying coefficient
version of such a rule. I am, however, well aware of the fact that my approach in this paper is
purely empirical and that more structure from a model would be welcome to fully understand the
interactions between the term premium and the macroeconomy. I leave that for future research.
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Appendices
A Term Structure Model
A.1 Gaussian Affine Term Structure Model
A.1.1 Derivation of the one-period nominal interest rate
First, let us impose a no-arbitrage restriction in a frictionless financial market that implies the
use of a stochastic discount factor (SDF) or Pricing Kernel. In this setting, the nominal price of a
zero-coupon bond follows the law of one price in the real or physical world P, such that:
Pn,t = E
P
t (Mt+1Pn−1,t+1) (A.1)
where Mt+1 is the strictly positive nominal stochastic discount factor and Pn,t is the nominal price
of a n-period zero-coupon bond at time t.
In particular, for a one-period zero-coupon bond, I have:
P1,t = E
P
t (Mt+1) (A.2)
Now, I assume that the nominal SDF is conditionally log-normally distributed, so that:
EPt (Mt+1) = e
µ +
σ2
2
(A.3)
where log(Mt+1) ∼ N (µ, σ2)
Hence, taking the logarithm in Equation (A.3) gives:
log[EPt (Mt+1)] = µ+
σ2
2
(A.4)
which using mt+1 = log(Mt+1), can be re-written:
log[EPt (Mt+1)] = E
P
t (mt+1) +
1
2
V arPt (mt+1) (A.5)
Using Equation (A.2) and r1,t = −log(P1,t), I obtain:
r1,t = −EPt (mt+1)−
1
2
V arPt (mt+1) (A.6)
where r1,t is the one-period nominal interest rate.
To simplify, I drop the period index for the nominal interest rate, which gives:
rt = −EPt (mt+1)−
1
2
V arPt (mt+1) (A.7)
A.1.2 Derivation of the nominal Stochastic Discount Factor
In the framework of Equations (2), (1) and (6), the assumption of no-arbitrage implies the existence
of the Radon-Nikodym derivative ξt
32 defined as the ratio of the risk-neutral probability Q to
32See Geiger (2011), Section 3.5.2 for more details.
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physical probability P of Section 2.1. I assume it follows a log-normal process, so that:
ξt+1 = ξte
− 12 Λ′tΛt−Λ′tεPt+1 (A.8)
where εPt+1 is the same disturbance as in Equation (2).
As the expression for the nominal SDF is:
Mt+1 = e
−rt ξt+1
ξt
(A.9)
I obtain the essentially affine form of the log of the nominal stochastic discount factor, as in Duffee
(2002):
mt+1 = −rt − 1
2
Λ′tΛt − Λ′tεPt+1 (A.10)
A.1.3 Nominal bond pricing
Pn,t = E
P
t (Mt+1Pn−1,t+1) (A.11)
Plug Equations (A.10) and (7):
Pn,t = E
P
t [exp(−rt −
1
2
Λ′tΛt − Λ′tεPt+1)exp(An−1 +B′n−1Xt+1)] (A.12)
Plug Equations (2) and (1):
Pn,t = E
P
t [exp(−δ0 − δ′1Xt −
1
2
Λ′tΛt − Λ′tεPt+1)exp(An−1 +B′n−1(µP + ΘPXt + ΣεεPt+1)] (A.13)
Pn,t = exp(−δ0−δ′1Xt−
1
2
Λ′tΛt+An−1+B
′
n−1µ
P+B′n−1Θ
PXt)E
P
t [exp((B
′
n−1Σε−Λ′t)εPt+1)] (A.14)
As εPt+1 ∼ N (0, IN ), then exp(εPt+1) is log-normally distributed so that:
EPt [exp(bε
P
t+1)] = exp(
1
2
bINb
′) (A.15)
with b = B′n−1Σε − Λ′t
Then,
Pn,t = exp(−δ0 − δ′1Xt −
1
2
Λ′tΛt +An−1 +B
′
n−1µ
P +B′n−1Θ
PXt)...
exp(
1
2
(B′n−1Σε − Λ′t)V arPt (εPt+1)(B′n−1Σε − Λ′t)′) (A.16)
And V arPt (ε
P
t+1) = IN , so:
Pn,t = exp(−δ0 − δ′1Xt −
1
2
Λ′tΛt +An−1 +B
′
n−1µ
P +B′n−1Θ
PXt)...
exp(
1
2
B′n−1ΣεΣ
′
εBn−1 −
1
2
B′n−1ΣεΛt −
1
2
Λ′tΣ
′
εBn−1 +
1
2
Λ′tΛt) (A.17)
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But Λ′tΣ
′
εBn−1 is ∈ R so it is also equal to its transpose, which is B′n−1ΣεΛt
Therefore, I obtain:
Pn,t = exp(−δ0 − δ′1Xt −
1
2
Λ′tΛt +An−1 +B
′
n−1µ
P +B′n−1Θ
PXt)...
exp(
1
2
B′n−1ΣεΣ
′
εBn−1 −B′n−1ΣεΛt +
1
2
Λ′tΛt) (A.18)
Now, plug Equation (6):
Pn,t = exp(−δ0 − δ′1Xt +An−1 +B′n−1µP +B′n−1ΘPXt)...
exp(
1
2
B′n−1ΣεΣ
′
εBn−1 −B′n−1(λ0 + λ1Xt)) (A.19)
Plug Equation (7) on the left-hand side:
exp(An +B
′
nXt) = exp(An−1 − δ0 +B′n−1(µP − λ0) +
1
2
B′n−1ΣεΣ
′
εBn−1)...
exp(B′n−1(Θ
P − λ1)Xt − δ′1Xt) (A.20)
By identification:
An = An−1 +B′n−1(µ
P − λ0)− δ0 + 1
2
B′n−1ΣεΣ
′
εBn−1 (A.21)
B′n = B
′
n−1(Θ
P − λ1)− δ′1 (A.22)
For the one-period zero-coupon bond, I have:
P1,t = E
P
t (Mt+1) (A.23)
P1,t = e
−rt (A.24)
P1,t = e
−δ0−δ′1Xt (A.25)
By identification, A1 = −δ0 and B1 = −δ1
Also, a zero-coupon bond maturing instantaneously has a price of one. This implies that A0 = 0
and B0 = (0, 0, 0)
′
Hence, by recursion and using the fact that ΘQ = ΘP − λ1 we find a solution for Equation (A.22):
B′n = −δ′1
n−1∑
j=0
(ΘP − λ1)j (A.26)
B′n = −δ′1[IN − (ΘQ)n](IN −ΘQ)−1 (A.27)
Unfortunately, there is no closed-form solution to Equation (A.21).
Finally, yield are obtained using:
yn,t = − 1
n
log(Pn,t) (A.28)
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A.2 Shadow Rate Term Structure Model
A.2.1 Expression of the nominal zero-coupon bond yield
Using Equation (A.1) and the law of iterated expectations under the risk-neutral measure Q, I
easily obtain:
Pn,t = E
Q
t [
n∏
j=1
Mt+j ] (A.29)
Using rt+j = −log(Mt+j+1), leads to:
Pn,t = E
Q
t (e
−∑n−1j=0 rt+j ) (A.30)
Plugging yn,t = − 1n log(Pn,t), I obtain:
yn,t = − 1
n
log[EQt (e
−∑n−1j=0 rt+j )] (A.31)
Now, I use Et[log(X)] = log[Et(X)]− 12V art[log(X)]:
yn,t = − 1
n
[EQt (−
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) +
1
2
V arQt (−
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j)] (A.32)
yn,t =
1
n
[
n−1∑
j=0
EQt (rt+j)−
1
2
V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j)] (A.33)
Now for tractability, let us focus on the expression of the one-period forward rate in n periods:
fn,n+1,t = (n+ 1)yn+1,t − nyn,t (A.34)
fn,n+1,t =
n∑
j=0
EQt (rt+j)−
1
2
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)−
n−1∑
j=0
EQt (rt+j) +
1
2
V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) (A.35)
fn,n+1,t = E
Q
t (rt+n)−
1
2
(V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j)) (A.36)
First, I express the first term on the right-hand side of Equation (A.36):
EQt (rt+n) = E
Q
t [max(¯
rt+n, st+n)] (A.37)
EQt (rt+n) = E
Q
t
[
max
(
¯
rt+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
,
st+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
)]
σQs,n + E
Q
t (st+n) (A.38)
EQt (rt+n) = [Prob
Q
t
(
st+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
< ¯
rt+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
)
×
(
¯
rt+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
)
+ ...
P robQt
(
st+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
≥ ¯rt+n − E
Q
t (st+n)
σQs,n
)
× ...
EQt
(
st+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
∣∣st+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
≥ ¯rt+n − E
Q
t (st+n)
σQs,n
)
σQs,n + E
Q
t (st+n)
(A.39)
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Now, assume that the shadow rate is conditionally normally distributed, so that:
st+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
∼ N (0, IN ) (A.40)
Moreover, Prob(x < α) = Φ(α) and Prob(x ≥ α)Et(x | x ≥ α) = φ(α) for x ∼ N (0, 1), where Φ
is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and φ is the standard normal probability
density function. Consequently, Equation (A.39) becomes:
EQt (rt+n) = [Φ
(
¯
rt+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
)(
¯
rt+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
)
+ ...
φ
(
¯
rt+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
)
]σQs,n + E
Q
t (st+n) (A.41)
Using the fact that Φ(−x) = 1− Φ(x) and φ(−x) = φ(x), we obtain:
EQt (rt+n) = ¯
rt+n +σ
Q
s,n×
[
Φ
(
EQt (st+n)−¯rt+n
σQs,n
)(
EQt (st+n)−¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
+ φ
(
EQt (st+n)−¯rt+n
σQs,n
)]
(A.42)
EQt (rt+n) = ¯
rt+n + σ
Q
s,n × g
(
EQt (st+n)−¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
(A.43)
where g(x) = xΦ(x) + φ(x)
Besides,
EQt (st+n) = δ0 + δ
′
1E
Q
t (Xt+n) (A.44)
And under the probability measure Q, iterating Equation (2) gives:
Xt+n =
n−1∑
j=0
ΘQjµQ + ΘQnXt +
n−1∑
j=0
ΘQjΣεε
Q
t+n−j (A.45)
Hence, the conditional expectation of the shadow rate st+n is:
EQt (st+n) = δ0 + δ
′
1(
n−1∑
j=0
ΘQjµQ + ΘQnXt) (A.46)
Also, using Equation (1) for st and Equation (A.45), I find the standard deviation of the shadow
rate st+n:
σQs,n = [V ar
Q
t (st+n)]
1/2 = [δ′1V ar
Q
t (Xt+n)δ1]
1/2
σQs,n = [
n−1∑
j=0
δ′1Θ
QjΣεΣ
′
εΘ
Qj ′δ1]1/2 (A.47)
Define a¯n = δ0 + δ
′
1
(∑n−1
j=0 Θ
Qj
)
µQ
an = a¯n − 12δ′1
(∑n−1
j=0 Θ
Qj
)
ΣεΣ
′
ε
(∑n−1
j=0 Θ
Qj
)′
δ1
b′n = δ
′
1Θ
Qn
σQs,n = [
∑n−1
j=0 δ
′
1(Θ
Q)jΣεΣ′ε(Θ
Q)j ′δ1]1/2
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Thus,
EQt (rt+n) = ¯
rt+n + σ
Q
s,n × g
(
a¯n + b
′
nXt −¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
(A.48)
Note from Equation (A.43) that when EQt (st+j)  ¯rt+n, g(x) → x and E
Q
t (rt+n) ≈ EQt (st+n)
i.e. the expected short-term interest rate is close to the expected shadow rate when the shadow
rate is far above the lower bound
¯
rt. On the other hand, when E
Q
t (st+n)  ¯rt+n, g(x) → 0 and
EQt (rt+n) ≈ ¯rt+n, i.e. the expected short-term interest rate is close to the lower bound when the
shadow rate is far below the lower bound.
Now, let us focus on the second term on the right-hand side of Equation (A.36):
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) = ...
n∑
j=0
V arQt (rt+j) + 2
n−1∑
i=0
n∑
j=i+1
covQt (rt+j , rt+i)−
n−1∑
j=0
V arQt (rt+j)− 2
n−2∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=i+1
covQt (rt+j , rt+i)
(A.49)
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) = V ar
Q
t (rt+n) + 2
n−1∑
i=0
covQt (rt+n, rt+i) (A.50)
As in Wu & Xia (2016), assume that V arQt (rt+n) ≈ ProbQt (st+n ≥ ¯rt+n)V ar
Q
t (st+n)
and covQt (rt+n, rt+i) ≈ ProbQt (st+n ≥ ¯rt+n)cov
Q
t (st+n, st+i) ∀ (i, j) ∈ [[0, n− 2]]× [[1, n− 1]]
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ ...
P robQt (st+n ≥ ¯rt+n)V ar
Q
t (st+n) + 2
n−1∑
i=0
ProbQt (st+n ≥ ¯rt+n)cov
Q
t (st+n, st+i) (A.51)
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ ...
P robQt (st+n ≥ ¯rt+n)[
n∑
j=0
V arQt (rt+j)−
n−1∑
j=0
V arQt (rt+j) + ...
2
n−1∑
i=0
n∑
j=i+1
covQt (st+j , st+i)− 2
n−2∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=i+1
covQt (st+j , st+i)] (A.52)
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)−V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ ProbQt (st+n ≥ ¯rt+n)[V ar
Q
t (
n∑
j=0
st+j)−V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
st+j)] (A.53)
44
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ ProbQt
(
st+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n)
≥ ¯rt+n − E
Q
t (st+n)
σQs,n
)
× ...
[V arQt (
n∑
j=0
st+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
st+j)] (A.54)
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ [1− ProbQt
(
st+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n)
< ¯
rt+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
)
]× ...
[V arQt (
n∑
j=0
st+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
st+j)] (A.55)
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ [1− Φ
(
¯
rt+n − EQt (st+n)
σQs,n
)
]× ...
[V arQt (
n∑
j=0
st+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
st+j)] (A.56)
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ Φ
(
EQt (st+n)−¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
× ...
[V arQt (
n∑
j=0
st+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
st+j)] (A.57)
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ Φ
(
EQt (st+n)−¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
× ...
[V arQt (st+n) + 2
n−1∑
j=0
covQt (st+n, st+j)] (A.58)
Now recall that: st+j = δ0 + δ
′
1Xt+j and σ
Q
s,n = [
∑n−1
j=0 δ
′
1(Θ
Q)jΣεΣ′ε(Θ
Q)j ′δ1]1/2
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ Φ
(
EQt (st+n)−¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
× ...
(
n−1∑
j=0
δ′1(Θ
Q)jΣεΣ
′
ε(Θ
Q)j ′δ1 + 2
n−1∑
j=0
covQt (δ
′
1Xt+j , δ
′
1Xt+i) (A.59)
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Using Equation (A.45), we obtain:
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ Φ
(
EQt (st+n)−¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
× ...
(
n−1∑
j=0
δ′1(Θ
Q)jΣεΣ
′
ε(Θ
Q)j ′δ1 + 2δ1
n−1∑
j=0
covQt (
j−1∑
k=0
ΘQkΣεεt+j−k,
i−1∑
q=0
ΘQqΣεεt+i−q)δ′1 (A.60)
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ Φ
(
EQt (st+n)−¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
× ...
(
n−1∑
j=0
δ′1(Θ
Q)jΣεΣ
′
ε(Θ
Q)j ′δ1 + 2δ1
n−1∑
j=0
j−1∑
k=0
i−1∑
q=0
ΘQkΣεcov
Q
t (εt+j−k, εt+i−q)Σ
′
εΘ
Qq ′δ′1 (A.61)
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ Φ
(
EQt (st+n)−¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
× ...
(
n−1∑
j=0
δ′1(Θ
Q)jΣεΣ
′
ε(Θ
Q)j ′δ1 + 2δ1
n−1∑
j=0
i−1∑
q=0
δ′1Θ
Qn−i+qΣεΣ′εΘ
Qq ′δ′1 (A.62)
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ Φ
(
EQt (st+n)−¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
× ...
δ′1
n−1∑
j=0
(ΘQ)j
ΣεΣ′ε
n−1∑
j=0
(ΘQ)j
′ δ1 (A.63)
So in summary,
V arQt (
n∑
j=0
rt+j)− V arQt (
n−1∑
j=0
rt+j) ≈ Φ
(
a¯n + b
′
nXt −¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
× (a¯n − an) (A.64)
I now plug Equations (A.48) and (A.64) into Equation (A.36):
fn,n+1,t ≈
¯
rt+n + σ
Q
s,j × g
(
a¯n + b
′
nXt −¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
+ Φ
(
a¯n + b
′
nXt −¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
× (an − a¯n) (A.65)
fn,n+1,t ≈
¯
rt+n + σ
Q
s,j × g
(
a¯n + b
′
nXt −¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
+
∂g
(
a¯n+b
′
nXt−¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
∂a¯n
× (an − a¯n) (A.66)
fn,n+1,t ≈
¯
rt+n + σ
Q
s,n × g
(
an + b
′
nXt −¯rt+n
σQs,n
)
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where g(x) = xΦ(x) + φ(x)
an = δ0 + δ
′
1
(∑n−1
j=0 Θ
Qj
)
µQ − 12δ′1
(∑n−1
j=0 Θ
Qj
)
ΣεΣ
′
ε
(∑n−1
j=0 Θ
Qj
)′
δ1
b′n = δ
′
1Θ
Qn
σQs,n = [
∑n−1
q=0 δ
′
1(Θ
Q)qΣεΣ′ε(Θ
Q)q ′δ1]1/2
Note that I have an = An − An+1 and b′n = B′n − B′n+1 as fGATSMn,n+1,t = an + b′nXt, where An and
Bn are the coefficients from the GATSM in Equations (A.21) and (A.22).
Besides, when
¯
rt+n → −∞, g(x)→ x and fn,n+1,t → fGATSMn,n+1,t
Finally, using the fact that f0,1,t = y1,t = rt I retrieve the expression of the n-period nominal
zero-coupon bond yield yn,t:
yn,t =
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
fj,j+1,t
A.3 Transformation of the factors
To prove Equation (15), let us start with Equation (2):
Xt = µ
P + ΘPXt−1 + ΣεεPt (A.67)
Now, apply weights W to the model-implied yields Yt to obtain the model-implied principal com-
ponents Pt:
Pt = WYt = W (A+B′Xt) = WA+WB′Xt (A.68)
where A ∈ RJ and B ∈MN×J(R) contain coefficients An and Bn from the GATSM (see Section
2.1), for the J picked maturities, as defined in Appendix A.4.1
Let us plug Equation (A.67) into Equation (A.68):
WA+WB′Xt = WA+WB′(µP + ΘPXt−1 + ΣεεPt ) (A.69)
Pt = WA+WB′µP +WB′ΘPXt−1 +WB′ΣεεPt (A.70)
Pt = WA+WB′µP +WB′ΘP(WB′)−1WB′Xt−1 +WB′ΣεεPt (A.71)
Pt = WA+WB′µP +WB′ΘP(WB′)−1WA−WB′ΘP(WB′)−1WA+ ...
WB′ΘP(WB′)−1WB′Xt−1 +WB′ΣεεPt (A.72)
Pt = WA+WB′µP −WB′ΘP(WB′)−1WA+ ...
+WB′ΘP(WB′)−1(WA+WB′Xt−1) +WB′ΣεεPt (A.73)
Let us plug Equation (A.67) at time t = t− 1. We obtain:
Pt = µPP + ΘPPPt−1 + Σε,PεPt (A.74)
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where µPP = WA + WB
′µP −WB′ΘP(WB′)−1WA ∈ RN , ΘPP = WB′ΘP(WB′)−1 ∈ MN×N (R)
and Σε,P = WB′Σε ∈MN×N (R)
Equation (16) is proved similarly.
Besides, we give the expression of the shadow rate in the rotated world. To do so, let us start with
Equation (1):
st = δ0 + δ
′
1Xt (A.75)
Xt = δ
′−1
1 (st − δ0) (A.76)
let us plug Equation (A.67) reverted:
(WB′)−1(Pt −WA) = δ′−11 (st − δ0) (A.77)
st = δ0 − δ′1(WB′)−1WA+ δ′1(WB′)−1Pt (A.78)
st = δ0,P + δ′1,PPt (A.79)
where δ0,P = δ0 − δ′1(WB′)−1WA ∈ R and δ1,P = [(WB′)−1]′δ1 ∈ RN
Finally, zero-coupon bond yields in the GATSM framework are given by:
Yt = A+B
′Xt (A.80)
where A ∈ RJ and B ∈MN×J(R) contain coefficients An and Bn from the GATSM (see Section
2.1), for the J = 12 picked maturities, as defined in Appendix A.4.1
To obtain the expression in the rotated world, let us plug Equation (A.67):
Yt = A+B
′(WB′)−1(Pt −WA) (A.81)
Yt = A−B′(WB′)−1WA+B′(WB′)−1Pt (A.82)
Yt = AP +BPPt (A.83)
where AP = [In −B′(WB′)−1W ]A ∈ RJ and BP = B′(WB′)−1 ∈MN×J(R)
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Figure 13: Loadings on observed yields
Loadings of observed yields from 2004:M9 to 2018:M12
Loadings presented on Figure 13 have very classic shapes. The first loading is quasi flat as it
is usually the case for the level, the second is downward slopping as for the slope and the third has
a humped shape that is similar to the loading on a curvature factor.
A.4 Estimation
A.4.1 Kalman Filter for the GATSM
The procedure presented here is similar to the one detailed in Lemke (2006), Section 5.33
In the Gaussian Affine Term Structure framework of Section 2.1, my state-space model is com-
posed of a linear transition Equation (2) and a linear measurement Equation (17), because of the
linear nature of yn,t in Equation (8).
Transition equation:
Xt = µ
P + ΘPXt−1 + ΣεεPt (A.84)
where Xt = (X
1
t , X
2
t , X
3
t )
′, µP = (µP1, µ
P
2, µ
P
3, )
′, εPt = (ε
1
t
P, ε2t
P, ε3t
P)′ with εit
P iid∼ N (0, 1) for
i ∈ [[1, 3]]
ΘP =
 θP11 θP12 θP13θP21 θP22 θP23
θP31 θ
P
32 θ
P
33
 , Σε =
 σε11 0 0σε21 σε22 0
σε31 σε32 σε33

Measurement equation:
Y ◦t = A+B
′Xt + Σςςt (A.85)
where Y ◦t = (y
◦
1,t, y
◦
2,t, y
◦
4,t, y
◦
8,t, y
◦
12,t, y
◦
20,t, y
◦
28,t, y
◦
40,t, y
◦
60,t, y
◦
80,t, y
◦
100,t, y
◦
120,t)
′ ∈ R12
33See equivalently Hamilton (1994), Section 13, Lu¨tkepohl (2005), Section 18, Durbin & Koopman (2012), Section
4 and 7 or Krippner (2015), Section 3.2.
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A = (−A1,− 12A2,− 14A4,− 18A8,− 112A12,− 120A20,− 128A28, ...,− 1120A120)′ ∈ R12
B = (−B1,− 12B2,− 14B4,− 18B8,− 112B12,− 120B20,− 128B28, ...,− 1120B120) ∈M3×12(R)
Σς ∈M12×12(R) with Σς = diag(σς , ..., σς),
ςt = (ς1,t, ς2,t, ς4,t, ς8,t, ς12,t, ς20,t, ς28,t, ς40,t, ς60,t, ς80,t, ς100,t, ς120,t)
′ ∈ R12
with ςn,t ∼ N (0, 1) for n ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 20, 28, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120}
Moreover, parameters δ0 and δ1 from Equation (1) are such that:
δ0 = 0, δ1 = (1, 1, 1)
′
While parameters from the risk-neutral probability measure of Equation (3), µQ and ΘQ are such
that:
µQ = (µQ1 , 0, 0)
′
ΘQ is in ordered real Jordan form:34
ΘQ =
 θQ1 ρ12 00 θQ2 ρ23
0 0 θQ3
 (A.86)
where θQ1 , θ
Q
2 , θ
Q
3 are real eigenvalues and |θQ1 | > |θQ2 | > |θQ3 |.
ρ12 = 1 if θ
Q
1 = θ
Q
2 and 0 otherwise. ρ23 = 1 if θ
Q
2 = θ
Q
3 and 0 otherwise.
Finally, parameters λ0 and λ1 from Equation (6) are left unrestricted.
35
I now stack all the parameters to be estimated in a vector Ω ∈ R23:
Ω = (µQ1 , µ
P
1, µ
P
2, µ
P
3, θ
Q
1 , θ
Q
2 , θ
Q
3 , θ
P
11, θ
P
12, θ
P
13, θ
P
21, θ
P
22, θ
P
23, θ
P
31, θ
P
32, θ
P
33, ...
σε11, σε21, σε22, σε31, σε32, σε33, σς)
′ (A.87)
Under the Gaussian assumption, the distribution of Y ◦t conditional on the sequence of observations
Y◦t−1 = (Y ◦0 , Y ◦1 , ..., Y ◦t−1)′ is multivariate normal such that:
Y ◦t | Y◦t−1 ∼ N ((A+B′Xˆt|t−1), Ft) (A.88)
where Ft = B
′Pt|t−1B + ΣςΣ′ς
with Pt|t−1 is the Mean Squared Error (MSE) matrix:
Pt|t−1 = Et−1[(Xt − Xˆt|t−1)(Xt − Xˆt|t−1)′] (A.89)
In this framework, the conditional density of Yt can be written as:
p(Y ◦t | Y◦t−1; Ω) =
exp[− 12 (Y ◦t −A−B′Xˆt|t−1)′F−1t (Y ◦t −A−B′Xˆt|t−1)]
(2pi)J/2 | Ft |1/2 (A.90)
34See Joslin, Singleton & Zhu (2011), Appendix C
35Still, they remain restricted by Equations (4) and (5).
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with J = 12 in my case.
Hence, the sample log-likelihood function is:
L(Y ◦t ,Ω) =
T∑
t=1
log[p(Y ◦t | Y◦t−1; Ω)] (A.91)
L(Y ◦t ,Ω) = −
JT
2
log(2pi)− 1
2
T∑
t=1
log | Ft | −...
1
2
T∑
t=1
(Y ◦t −A−B′Xˆt|t−1)′F−1t (Y ◦t −A−B′Xˆt|t−1) (A.92)
Let us now specify the Kalman filter algorithm:
I start at i = 0, where i is the number of iterations.
Step 0: Setup
Ω = Ω0
i = i+ 1
Step 1: Initialization
Set Xˆ0|0 = Xˆ0 and P0|0 = P0
t=1
Step 2: Prediction 1 ≤ t ≤ T
1) Xˆt|t−1 = µP + ΘPXˆt−1|t−1
2) Pt|t−1 = ΘPPt−1|t−1ΘP′ + ΣεΣ′ε
3) Yˆt|t−1 = A+B′Xˆt|t−1
4) Ft = B
′Pt|t−1B + ΣςΣ′ς
Step 3: Updating at t
1) Kt = Pt|t−1BF
−1
t
2) Xˆt|t = Xˆt|t−1 +Kt(Y ◦t − Yˆt|t−1)
3)Pt|t = Pt|t−1 −KtB′Pt|t−1
Step 4: Loop
If t < T then t = t+ 1 and go to Step 2, else go to Step 5
Step 5: Compute the log-likelihood
Compute the log-likelihood Li(Y ◦t ,Ω0) using Equation (A.92)
Step 6: Compare the log-likelihood
If | Li(Y ◦t ,Ω0) − Li−1(Y ◦t ,Ω0) |≤ , where  = 10−8 is the convergence criterion, then stop. Else
go to Step 0
Starting values for a stationary process Xt are the unconditional mean and variances:
36
36See Hamilton (1994), Chapter 13 page 378
51
Xˆ0|0 = (IN −ΘP)−1µP and P0|0 = vec−1([I3×3 − (ΘP ⊗ΘP)]−1vec(ΣεΣ′ε))
I employ the Quasi-Newton optimization algorithm included in the function ”fminunc” available
in MatLab Optimization Toolbox.37
A.4.2 Extended Kalman Filter for the SRTSM
The procedure presented here is similar to the one detailed in Wu & Xia (2016).38
In the Shadow Rate Term Structure framework of Section 2.2, my state-space model is com-
posed of a linear transition Equation (2) and a non-linear measurement Equation (17), because of
the non-linear nature of yn,t in Equation (12).
In particular, transition Equation (A.84) from Appendix A.4.1 remains valid, but the mea-
surement Equation is now:
Y ◦t = f(Xt) + Σςςt (A.93)
where Y ◦t = (y
◦
1,t, y
◦
2,t, y
◦
4,t, y
◦
8,t, y
◦
12,t, y
◦
20,t, y
◦
28,t, y
◦
40,t, y
◦
60,t, y
◦
80,t, y
◦
100,t, y
◦
120,t)
′ ∈ R12
f is the non-linear function that links the n-period nominal zero-coupon yield to the state vector
as detailed in Equation (12).
Σς ∈M12×12(R) with Σς = diag(σς , ..., σς) and
ςt = (ς1,t, ς2,t, ς4,t, ς8,t, ς12,t, ς20,t, ς28,t, ς40,t, ς60,t, ς80,t, ς100,t, ς120,t)
′ ∈ R12
with ςn,t ∼ N (0, 1) for n ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 20, 28, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120}
Furthermore, following the same parametrization as in the GATSM (Appendix A.4.1), let us
stack all the parameters to estimate in a vector Ω ∈ R23 (Equation (A.87)).
Under the Gaussian assumption, the distribution of Y ◦t conditional on the sequence of observations
Y◦t−1 = (Y ◦0 , Y ◦1 , ..., Y ◦t−1)′ is also multivariate normal such that:
Y ◦t | Y◦t−1 ∼ N (f(Xˆt|t−1), Ft) (A.94)
where Pt|t−1 is the Mean Squared Error (MSE) matrix as defined in Equation (A.89),
Ft = HtPt|t−1H ′t + ΣςΣ
′
ς
The matrix Ht ∈ M3x32(R) is the Jacobian of the yield function Y ◦t from Equation (A.93) with
respect to the state vector Xt:
H ′t =
∂Y ◦t
∂Xt
∣∣∣∣
Xt=Xˆt|t−1
(A.95)
37See Lu¨tkepohl (2005), Section 12.3.2 or Pawitan (2001), Section 12 for a discussion concerning the optimization
algorithms.
38See Krippner (2015), Section 4.2, Simon (2006), Section 13.2.3 or Grewal & Andrews (2008), Section 7.2.3.
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H ′t =

∂y◦1,t/∂x1,t ∂y
◦
1,t/∂x2,t ∂y
◦
1,t/∂x3,t
∂y◦2,t/∂x1,t ∂y
◦
2,t/∂x2,t ∂y
◦
2,t/∂x3,t
∂y◦4,t/∂x1,t ∂y
◦
4,t/∂x2,t ∂y
◦
4,t/∂x3,t
∂y◦8,t/∂x1,t ∂y
◦
8,t/∂x2,t ∂y
◦
8,t/∂x3,t
∂y◦12,t/∂x1,t ∂y
◦
12,t/∂x2,t ∂y
◦
12,t/∂x3,t
∂y◦20,t/∂x1,t ∂y
◦
20,t/∂x2,t ∂y
◦
20,t/∂x3,t
∂y◦28,t/∂x1,t ∂y
◦
28,t/∂x2,t ∂y
◦
28,t/∂x3,t
∂y◦40,t/∂x1,t ∂y
◦
40,t/∂x2,t ∂y
◦
40,t/∂x3,t
∂y◦60,t/∂x1,t ∂y
◦
60,t/∂x2,t ∂y
◦
60,t/∂x3,t
∂y◦80,t/∂x1,t ∂y
◦
80,t/∂x2,t ∂y
◦
80,t/∂x3,t
∂y◦100,t/∂x1,t ∂y
◦
100,t/∂x2,t ∂y
◦
100,t/∂x3,t
∂y◦120,t/∂x1,t ∂y
◦
120,t/∂x2,t ∂y
◦
120,t/∂x3,t

(A.96)
with Xt = (x1,t, x2,t, x3,t)
′. Note that I have dropped the |Xt=Xˆt|t−1 for convenience.
Ht = (H1,t, ...,Hn,t, ...,H120,t) ∈M3x32(R)
The elements ofHt are calculated using Equation (12), for n ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 20, 28, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120}
and i ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
∂y◦n,t
∂xi,t
=
1
n
∂
∑n−1
j=0 fj,j+1,t
∂xi,t
(A.97)
∂y◦n,t
∂xi,t
=
1
n
∂
∑n−1
j=0
(
¯
rt+j + σ
Q
s,j × g
(
aj+b
′
jXt−¯rt
σQs,j
))
∂xi,t
(A.98)
Denote θj =
aj+b
′
jXt−¯rt
σQs,j
:
∂y◦n,t
∂xi,t
=
1
n
∂
∑n−1
j=0 σ
Q
s,j × (θjΦ(θj) + φ(θj))
∂xi,t
(A.99)
∂y◦n,t
∂xi,t
=
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
σQs,j
∂ (θjΦ(θj) + φ(θj))
∂xi,t
(A.100)
∂y◦n,t
∂xi,t
=
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
σQs,j
(
∂θj
∂xi,t
Φ(θj) + θj
∂Φ(θj)
∂xi,t
+
∂φ(θj)
∂xi,t
)
(A.101)
Using the Chain rule, we obtain:
∂y◦n,t
∂xi,t
=
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
σQs,j
(
∂θj
∂xi,t
Φ(θj) + θj
∂Φ(θj)
∂θj
× ∂θj
∂xi,t
+
∂φ(θj)
∂θj
× ∂θj
∂xi,t
)
(A.102)
∂y◦n,t
∂xi,t
=
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
σQs,j
(
b′j
σQs,j
Φ(θj) + θjφ(θj)×
b′j
σQs,j
+
∂φ(θj)
∂θj
× b
′
j
σQs,j
)
(A.103)
Given that:
∂Φ(θj)
∂θj
= φ(θj) =
1√
2pi
exp(−1
2
θ2j ) (A.104)
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Then we have that:
∂φ(θj)
∂θj
= − 1√
2pi
θj × exp(−1
2
θ2j ) = −θjφ(θj) (A.105)
Hence Equation (A.103) becomes:
∂y◦n,t
∂xi,t
=
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
b′j (Φ(θj) + θjφ(θj)− θjφ(θj)) (A.106)
∂y◦n,t
∂xi,t
=
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
b′jΦ
(
aj + b
′
jXt −¯rt+j
σQs,j
)
(A.107)
As the case j = 0 is problematic, taking the limit gives:
Hn,t =
1
n
δ′1 + n−1∑
j=1
bjΦ
(
aj + b
′
jXt −¯rt+j
σQs,j
)
for n ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 20, 28, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120}
As in the GATSM case (Appendix A.4.1), we can express the sample log-likelihood function:
L(Y ◦t ,Ω) = −
JT
2
log(2pi)− 1
2
T∑
t=1
log | Ft | −...
1
2
T∑
t=1
(Y ◦t − f(Xˆt|t−1))′F−1t (Y ◦t − f(Xˆt|t−1)) (A.108)
with J = 12 in my case.
Let us now specify the extended Kalman filter algorithm:
Step 0, 1, 4, 5, 6 are similar to the ones for the Kalman filter (Appendix A.4.1).
However, Step 2 and Step 3 become:
Step 2: Prediction 1 ≤ t ≤ T
1) Xˆt|t−1 = µP + ΘPXˆt−1|t−1
2) Pt|t−1 = ΘPPt−1|t−1ΘP′ + ΣεΣ′ε
3) Yˆt|t−1 = f(Xˆt|t−1)
4) Ft = H
′
tPt|t−1Ht + ΣςΣ
′
ς with H
′
t =
∂Y ◦t
∂Xt
∣∣∣
Xt=Xˆt|t−1
Step 3: Updating at t
1) Kt = Pt|t−1HtF
−1
t
2) Xˆt|t = Xˆt|t−1 +Kt(Y ◦t − Yˆt|t−1)
3)Pt|t = Pt|t−1 −KtH ′tPt|t−1
A.5 Results
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Table 6: Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Parameter SRTSM
µQ1,P 0.753
µQ2,P -0.713
µQ3,P 0.205
µP1,P 2.921
µP2,P -1.524
µP3,P 0.698
θQ11,P 1.003
θQ12,P -0.127
θQ13,P -0.155
θQ21,P 0.006
θQ22,P 0.931
θQ23,P -0.171
θQ31,P 0.000
θQ32,P 0.002
θQ33,P 1.009
θP11,P 1.045
θP12,P 0.130
θP13,P -3.060
θP21,P -0.021
θP22,P 0.917
θP23,P 1.498
θP31,P 0.011
θP32,P 0.035
θP33,P 0.285
σε11,P -0.104
σε12,P 0.155
σε13,P 0.358
σε21,P 0.026
σε22,P -0.147
σε23,P 0.136
σε31,P -0.032
σε32,P -0.011
σε33,P -0.009
σς 0.101
δ0P 0.068
δ11,P 0.296
δ12,P 0.429
δ13,P 0.258
Log-Likelihood 1292
RMSE 0.178
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Table 7: Models Fit
Model GATSM SRTSM (A) SRTSM (B)
LLH 1256 1271 1292
RMSE 0.214 0.179 0.178
Sample period: 2004M09-2018M12
LLH stands for Log-Likelihood
RMSE stands for Root Mean Square Error
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Figure 14: Yield Curves
Median yield curves over 2004:M9-2018:M12
Figure 15: Shadow Rate Term Structure Fitted Yield Surface
Fitted Yield surface from 2004:M9 to 2018:M12
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Figure 16: Shadow Rate
Shadow rate from 2004:M9 to 2018:M12
Solid grey area corresponds to a recession period as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
Figure 17: Factors - SRTSM
Rotated factors
Solid grey area corresponds to a recession period as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
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Figure 18: Terminal rates
Terminal rates between 2004:M9 and 2018:M12
Solid grey areas correspond to recession periods as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
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Figure 19: Daily terminal rate during months of key announcement dates
Terminal rate in the month of the major QE-related announcements
Red vertical bar corresponds to announcement
Figure 20: Daily 10-year yield during months of key announcement dates
10-year yield in the month of the major QE-related announcements
Red vertical bar corresponds to announcement
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Figure 21: Fall in the curves following QE announcement
Figure 22: Fall in the term premium following QE announcement
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B B-SVAR approach
B.1 Structural indentification
B.1.1 Traditional sign restrictions
In the framework of Equations (23), identification is reached by orthogonalizing the shocks to
isolate their impact on the endogenous variables. To do so, let us first build ut, a vector of un-
correlated (though not standardized) shocks containing the same information as in t. Then, let
us build vt so that a one unit shock on vi,t corresponds to a one standard deviation shock on ui,t.
In the following, I detail the process for the case of an SVAR with three endogenous variables for
parsimony, but the procedure remains similar for the more general case of N variables.
Let us first write the Cholesky decomposition of Σ: Σ = PP
′ = ADA′ with
t = Aut = AD
1/2vt = Pvt, where A ∈ M3x3(R) is a lower triangular matrix with ones on its
diagonal, P ∈M3x3(R) is a lower triangular and non-singular matrix, D is a diagonal matrix such
that V art(ut) = D and vt is the vector of uncorrelated and standardized shocks, such that Σv = I3.
Therefore:
P =

√
V(1,t) 0 0
a21
√
V(1,t)
√
V(2,t) 0
a31
√
V(1,t) a32
√
V(2,t)
√
V(3,t)
 (B.1)
where the elements of P are recovered using u1t = 1t and ujt = jt −
j−1∑
k=1
ajkukt ∀ j ∈ [[1, 3]], such
that cov(ujt, uit) = 0 ∀ i < j.
I now define Q′, a random orthonormal matrix such that Q′Q = QQ′ = I3 and t = Pvt =
PQQ′vt = PQwt, where B = PQ is called the implied structural impact multiplier matrix with
B ∈M3x3(R) and wt is the vector of structural shocks from Equation (24). To build the orthogonal
matrix Q, I employ the Householder transformation approach.39 That is, I define W ∈ M3x3(R),
whose elements are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) draws from a standard normal
distribution. I then use a QR-decomposition by defining W = QR with R ∈ M3x3(R) an upper
triangular matrix. If W is invertible and the diagonal elements of R are positive, the decomposi-
tion is unique. In practice, I generate the rotation matrix Q until the implied structural impact
multiplier matrix B = PQ that satisfies my sign restrictions.
B.1.2 Zero restrictions
If a zero restriction is added on impact on the Impulse Response Function, the procedure to draw
matrix Q is modified. One has to draw the columns of Q recursively following the below algorithm:
Step 0: initialization
Set j=1 and gather the impulse response functions in a matrix Ψ = C˜0 where C˜0 = C0P is the
orthogonalized IRF at period 0.
Step 1: Iteration j
Create a selection matrix Zj ∈ M1x3p(R) for Ψ where Zj = ∅ if no zero restriction is applied to
shock j. Then, create a matrix Rj = (ZjΨ, Q
′
j−1)
′ where Qj−1 is composed of the columns of Q
39See Kilian & Lu¨tkepohl (2016) for a discussion on the different methods available for identification using sign
restrictions.
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already drawn with Q0 = ∅.
Step 2: Iteration j
If Rj 6= ∅, build a matrix Mj−1 that is a non-zero orthonormal basis of Rj .
Step 3: Iteration j
Draw a random vector yj of size n = 3 from a standard normal distribution.
Step 4: Iteration j
If Rj 6= ∅, define column j of Q: qj = M ′j−1(Mj−1yj/||M ′j−1yj ||). If Rj = ∅ then qj = yj/||yj ||.
Step 5
Repeat Step 1 to Step 4 until j = 3. Then Q = (q1, q2, q3).
Moreover, I now present the way to impose a zero response for h periods of one of the endogenous
variables, following a sock. I follow Baumeister & Benati (2013) by zeroing-out all coefficients in
the equation of that variable, except its own lags.
Especially, in the case of a three-variable SVAR, we have:
 b11 b12 b13b21 b22 b23
b31 b32 b33
−1 υ1,tυ2,t
υ3,t
 = p∑
k=1
 z11,k z12,k z13,kz21,k z22,k z23,k
z31,k z32,k z33,k
 υ1,t−kυ2,t−k
υ3,t−k
+
 w1tw2t
w3t
 (B.2)
The equation for υ3,t is:
υ3,t = b31
(
p∑
k=1
z11,kυ1,t−k +
p∑
k=1
z12,kυ2,t−k +
p∑
k=1
z13,kυ3,t−k + w1t
)
+b32
(
p∑
k=1
z21,kυ1,t−k +
p∑
k=1
z22,kυ2,t−k +
p∑
k=1
z23,kυ3,t−k + w2t
)
+b33
(
p∑
k=1
z31,kυ1,t−k +
p∑
k=1
z32,kυ2,t−k +
p∑
k=1
υ3,t−k + w3t
)
If one wants to force the IRF of υ3,t to structural shock w
2
t at zero, I set b31, b32, z13,k and z23,k to
zero and compute the IRF using the Wold decomposition with this modified Equation for period
1 to h and using the original Equation from period h+ 1 on.
B.1.3 Narrative sign restrictions
In the following, I present the mathematical expressions of the developed Narrative sign restric-
tions that it is possible to impose on the structural shocks and on the historical decompositions.
I start by the plain restrictions given in Antol´ın-Dı´az & Rubio-Ramı´rez (2018) and then provide
my developed version.
Class I ⊕ restriction on structural shock w3t at date ts takes the form:
StsF (Θ)e3 > 0 (B.3)
where e3 is the third column of I3
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F ∈ M3(p+1)×3(R) is such that F = (B−1, Z1, ..., Zp)′ contains the structural parameters from
Equation (24). Besides, Sts ∈M1×3(p+1)(R) is a matrix of full row rank such that:
Sts =
(
υ1,ts υ2,ts υ3,ts . . . −υ1,ts−p −υ2,ts−p −υ3,ts−p
)
(B.4)
Class I 	 restriction is simply StsF (Θ)e3 < 0.
Class II Type 1 restriction on the historical decomposition of υ3 at date ts takes the form:
SF (Θ)e3 > 0 (B.5)
where e3 is the third column of I3
F ∈M3×3(R) is such that:
F =
 0 |Hυ3,w2,ts | − |Hυ3,w1,ts | |Hυ3,w3,ts | − |Hυ3,w1,ts ||Hυ3,w1,ts | − |Hυ3,w2,ts | 0 |Hυ3,w3,ts | − |Hυ3,w2,ts |
|Hυ3,w1,ts | − |Hυ3,w3,ts | |Hυ3,w2,ts | − |Hυ3,w3,ts | 0
 (B.6)
where Hj,wi,ts is defined in Equation (27)
In addition, S ∈ M(3−1)×3(R) is a matrix of full row rank such that S =
∑3−1
j=1 ej,3−1e
′
j,3, where
ej,i is the j
th column of Ii
Class II Type 2 restriction takes the form:
SF (Θ)e3 > 0 (B.7)
where e3 is the third column of I3
F = (F1, F2, F3) ∈M3×3(R) is such that:
F1 =
 |Hυ1,w1,ts | − |Hυ1,w2,ts | − |Hυ1,w3,ts ||Hυ2,w1,ts | − |Hυ2,w2,ts | − |Hυ2,w3,ts |
|Hυ3,w1,ts | − |Hυ3,w2,ts | − |Hυ3,w3,ts |

F2 =
 |Hυ1,w2,ts | − |Hυ1,w1,ts | − |Hυ1,w3,ts ||Hυ2,w2,ts | − |Hυ2,w1,ts | − |Hυ2,w3,ts |
|Hυ3,w2,ts | − |Hυ3,w1,ts | − |Hυ3,w3,ts |

F3 =
 |Hυ1,w3,ts | − |Hυ1,w2,ts | − |Hυ1,w1,ts ||Hυ2,w3,ts | − |Hυ2,w2,ts | − |Hυ2,w1,ts |
|Hυ3,w3,ts | − |Hυ3,w2,ts | − |Hυ3,w1,ts |
 (B.8)
S = e′3 is the transpose of the third column of I3
Now, what follows constitute my developed Narrative restrictions:
Class I Type 1 restriction takes the form:
|StsF (Θ)e3| > |StsF (Θ)ei| ∀ i ∈ [[1, 2]] (B.9)
Class I Type 2 is:
|StsF (Θ)e3| > |StsF (Θ)e1|+ |StsF (Θ)e2| (B.10)
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Class I Category A restriction is:
|StsF (Θ)e3| > |StjF (Θ)e3| ∀ j ∈ [[1, T ]] \ {s} (B.11)
With F and S as in Equation (B.3)
Moreover, Class II is ⊕ if Hυ3,w3,ts > 0 and 	 if Hυ3,w3,ts < 0.
Finally, Class II Category A is expressed by:
|Hυ3,w3,ts | > |Hυ3,w3,tj | ∀ j ∈ [[1, T ]] \ {s} (B.12)
B.2 Bayesian Estimation of the VAR
In this subsection, I present the method to conduct a Bayesian estimation of a VAR with Natural
Conjugate (Normal-Wishart) priors over the reduced-form parametrization. Calculations are in-
spired from Canova (2007), Dieppe, Legrand & Van Roye (2016) and Kilian & Lu¨tkepohl (2016).
By the Bayes theorem we have:
p1(θ | YT ) = g(θ,YT )
p(YT ) (B.13)
And,
p1(θ | YT ) = L(θ)p0(θ)
p(YT ) (B.14)
where p1(θ | YT ) is the posterior density, g(θ,YT ) is the joint density of the sample and the pa-
rameters, L(θ) is the likelihood, p0(θ) is the prior density and p(YT ) is the marginal density of my
sample.
We also have that:
p(YT ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
L(θ)p0(θ)dθ (B.15)
To find expressions for the densities, I first re-write Equation (24) in a reduced form:40
Υt =
p∑
k=1
ΦkΥt−k + t (B.16)
where  ∼ N (0,Σ)
I now write the stacked form of the model, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T :
Υ = ZΦ + E (B.17)
where Υ ∈MT×3(R), Z ∈MT×3p(R), Φ ∈M3p×3(R) and E ∈MT×3(R)
Equation (B.17) can also be written:
x = (I3 ⊗ Z)β +  (B.18)
where  ∼ N (0,Σ ⊗ IT ),
40Let us assume for simplicity that there is no exogenous variables.
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x = (υ1,1, ..., υ1,T , υ2,1, ..., υ2,T , υ3,1, ..., υ3,T )
′ a 3× T vector,
β = vec(Φ) = vec(Φ1, ...,Φp) = (Φ11,1, ...,Φ33,1|...|Φ11,p, ...,Φ33,p)′ a 32 × p vector,
 = (υ1,1 , ..., υ1,T , υ2,1 , ..., υ2,T , υ3,1 , ..., υ3,T )
′ a 3× T vector,
And Z ∈MT×3p(R) such that:
Z =
 υ1,0 υ2,0 υ3,0 . . . υ1,−p+1 υ2,−p+1 υ3,−p+1... ... ... ... ... ... ...
υ1,T−1 υ2,T−1 υ3,T−1 . . . υ1,T−p υ2,T−p υ3,T−p

where I assume that the observations begin at t = −p+ 1 with p the number of lags.
B.2.1 Normal-Wishart prior
In the above framework, the prior density p0(θ) from Equation (B.14) is actually a joint density
of the VAR coefficients β and Σ, so that p0(θ) = p0(β,Σ). As it is not clear what such a joint
distribution would be, I follow the standard process that consists in assuming that the parameters
are independent so that the joint density becomes the product of the individual densities:
p0(θ) = p0(β)× p0(Σ) (B.19)
I assume that β follows a multivariate Normal distribution:
β ∼ N (β0,Σ ⊗ Ω0) (B.20)
where β0 is a 3
2p vector of Minnesota type. That is, elements of β0 are 0 except for the first own
lag of endogenous variables that are set to 0.841 I give an example of my model in the case of two
lags:
β0 = (0.8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.8, 0, 0, 0)
′
And where Ω0 ∈M3p×3p(R)
Ω0 also follows a Minnesota prior. It is a diagonal matrix with variance σ
2
ij,p =
(
1
σ2j
)(
λ1
pλ3
)2
for own and cross-lags of endogenous variables, where σ2j the OLS residual variance of individual
AR regressions for each endogenous variable, hyperparameter λ1 is an overall tightness parameter,
p is the lag considered and hyperparameter λ3 is a scaling coefficient ensuring an harmonic decay.
In the case of two lags, we have:
Ω0 =

(
λ1
σ1
)2
0 0 0 0 0
0
(
λ1
σ2
)2
0 0 0 0
0 0
(
λ1
σ3
)2
0 0 0
0 0 0
(
λ1/2
λ3
σ1
)2
0 0
0 0 0 0
(
λ1/2
λ3
σ2
)2
0
0 0 0 0 0
(
λ1/2
λ3
σ3
)2

41In the original Minnesota prior first own lag of endogenous variables are set to one as they are supposed to have
a unit root. Here we remain in a stationary framework.
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where I set λ1 = 0.01, λ3 = 1 and Σ is the OLS VAR diagonal variance-covariance matrix.
The kernel for β0 is therefore:
p0(β) =∝ exp{−1
2
(β − β0)′(Σ ⊗ Ω0)−1(β − β0)} (B.21)
Secondly, I assume that Σ follows an inverse Wishart distribution:
Σ ∼ IW(S0, ν0) (B.22)
where S0 ∈M3×3(R) is the prior scale matrix and ν0 is the prior degrees-of-freedom.
I follow Dieppe, Legrand & Van Roye (2016) in the way they are defined:
S0 = (ν0 − 3− 1)
 σ11 0 00 σ22 0
0 0 σ33

where ν0 = 3 + 2 and where σjj is the residual variance of AR model for endogenous variable j.
In this framework, the kernel for Σ is:
p0(Σ) ∝ |Σ|−(ν0+3+1)/2exp{−1
2
tr(Σ−1 S0)} (B.23)
B.2.2 Expression of the Likelihood
The associated likelihood for Gaussian model (B.17) and (B.18):
L(Φ,ΣE) = 1
(2pi)3T/2|ΣE |1/2 exp
[
− (Υ− ZΦ)
′Σ−1E (Υ− ZΦ)
2
]
(B.24)
L(β,Σ) =
exp[− 12 (υ − (I3 ⊗ Z)β)′(Σ−1 ⊗ IT )(υ − (I3 ⊗ Z)β)]
(2pi)3T/2|Σ ⊗ IT |1/2 (B.25)
Focusing on (B.25), I now develop the argument inside the exponential function:
(υ − (I3 ⊗ Z)β)′(Σ−1 ⊗ IT )(υ − (I3 ⊗ Z)β)
= (υ − (I3 ⊗ Z)β)′(Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )(Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )(υ − (I3 ⊗ Z)β)
= [(Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )′(υ − (I3 ⊗ Z)β)]′(Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )(υ − (I3 ⊗ Z)β) (B.26)
As Σ is symmetric, so is (Σ
−1/2
 ⊗ IT ). Therefore, (Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )′ = (Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )
Hence,
(υ − (I3 ⊗ Z)β)′(Σ−1 ⊗ IT )(υ − (I3 ⊗ Z)β)
= [(Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )υ − (Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )(I3 ⊗ Z)β]′[(Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )υ − (Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )(I3 ⊗ Z)β]
= [(Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )υ − (Σ−1/2 ⊗ Z)β]′[(Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )υ − (Σ−1/2 ⊗ Z)β] (B.27)
Since (Σ
−1/2
 ⊗ IT ) ∈M3T×3T (R) and (I3 ⊗ Z) ∈M3T×3∗3p(R)
Now, let us define W = Σ
−1/2
 ⊗ Z and w = (Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )υ
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Then,
(υ − (I3 ⊗ Z)β)′(Σ−1 ⊗ IT )(υ − (I3 ⊗ Z)β) (B.28)
= (w −Wβ)′(w −Wβ)
= (β − βˆ)′W ′W (β − βˆ) + (w −Wβˆ)′(w −Wβˆ)
where
βˆ = (W ′W )−1W ′w = (Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)−1(Σ−1 ⊗ Z)′υ
With these notations,
(Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )υ − (Σ−1/2 ⊗ Z)β
= (Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )υ − (Σ−1/2 ⊗ Z)βˆ + (Σ−1/2 ⊗ Z)(βˆ − β) (B.29)
Therefore plugging (B.29) into (B.27) and using (B.2.2) leads to a new expression for (B.28):
= [(Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )υ − (Σ−1/2 ⊗ Z)β]′[(Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )υ − (Σ−1/2 ⊗ Z)βˆ] + ...
(βˆ − β)′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)(βˆ − β)
let us now re-write expression (B.25):
L(β,Σ) = (2pi)−3T/2|Σ ⊗ IT |−1/2exp[−1
2
[(Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )υ − (Σ−1/2 ⊗ Z)βˆ]′[(Σ−1/2 ⊗ IT )υ − ...
(Σ−1/2 ⊗ Z)βˆ]−
1
2
(βˆ − β)′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)(βˆ − β)] (B.30)
let us develop the first part inside the exponential function:
L(β,Σ) = (2pi)−3T/2|Σ ⊗ IT |−1/2exp{−1
2
(β − βˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)(β − βˆ)} × ...
exp{−1
2
[υ′(Σ−1 ⊗ IT )υ − υ′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z)βˆ − βˆ′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′)υ + βˆ′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)βˆ]} (B.31)
But βˆ′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′)υ is a scalar so it is equal to its transpose:
L(β,Σ) = (2pi)−3T/2|Σ ⊗ IT |−1/2exp{−1
2
(β − βˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)(β − βˆ)} × ...
exp{−1
2
[υ′(Σ−1 ⊗ IT )υ − 2βˆ′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′)υ + βˆ′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)βˆ]} (B.32)
L(β,Σ) = (2pi)−3T/2|Σ ⊗ IT |−1/2exp{−1
2
(β − βˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)(β − βˆ)} × ...
exp{−1
2
[υ′(Σ−1 ⊗ IT )υ − 2βˆ′(I3 ⊗ Z)′(Σ−1 ⊗ IT )υ + βˆ′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′)(I3 ⊗ Z)βˆ]} (B.33)
L(β,Σ) = (2pi)−3T/2|Σ ⊗ IT |−1/2exp{−1
2
(β − βˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)(β − βˆ)} × ...
exp{−1
2
[υ′(Σ ⊗ IT )−1υ − 2[(I3 ⊗ Z)βˆ]′(Σ ⊗ IT )−1υ + βˆ′(I3 ⊗ Z)′(Σ ⊗ IT )−1(I3 ⊗ Z)βˆ]}
(B.34)
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let us now use the fact that:
((vec(X)− vec(M))′(V ⊗ U)−1(vec(Y )− vec(N)) = tr[V −1(X −M)′U−1(Y −N)] (B.35)
Hence Equation (B.34) becomes:
L(β,Σ) = (2pi)−3T/2|Σ ⊗ IT |−1/2exp{−1
2
(Φ− Φˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)(Φ− Φˆ)} × ...
exp{−1
2
[tr(Σ−1 Υ
′ITΥ)− 2tr(Σ−1 (ZΦˆ)′ITΥ) + tr(Σ−1 Φˆ′Z ′ITZΦˆ)]} (B.36)
L(β,Σ) = (2pi)−3T/2|Σ ⊗ IT |−1/2exp{−1
2
(Φ− Φˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)(Φ− Φˆ)} × ...
exp{−1
2
[tr(ΥΣ−1 Υ
′ − 2ΥΣ−1 Φˆ′Z ′ + ZΦˆΣ−1 Φˆ′Z ′)]} (B.37)
L(β,Σ) = (2pi)−3T/2|Σ ⊗ IT |−1/2exp{−1
2
(Φ− Φˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)(Φ− Φˆ)} × ...
exp{−1
2
[tr(Σ−1 (Υ− ZΦˆ)′(Υ− ZΦˆ)]} (B.38)
Now, as |A⊗B| = |A|m|B|n for (A,B) ∈Mn×n(R)×Mm×m(R)
Then, |Σ ⊗ IT |−1/2 = |Σ|T/2 = |Σ|−3p/2|Σ|−(T−3p)/2 = |Σ|−3p/2|Σ|−[(T−3(p+1)−1)+3+1]/2
Also, (Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z) = [(Σ ⊗ (Z ′Z)−1]−1
Therefore, Equation (B.38) becomes:
L(β,Σ) = (2pi)−3T/2|Σ|−3p/2exp{−1
2
(Φ− Φˆ)′[(Σ ⊗ (Z ′Z)−1]−1(Φ− Φˆ)} × ...
|Σ|−[(T−3(p+1)−1)+3+1]/2exp{−1
2
[tr(Σ−1 (Υ− ZΦˆ)′(Υ− ZΦˆ)]} (B.39)
L(β,Σ) = (2pi)−3T/2(2pi)3p/2|(Z ′Z)|−3/2MVN (Φˆ,Σ⊗(Z ′Z)−1)×23ν/2|Sˆ|−ν/2Γ3
(ν
2
)
IW(Sˆ, ν)
(B.40)
where Γ is the multivariate Gamma function
Thus, expression (B.25) can be expressed in terms of a multivariate Normal distribution and
an inverse Wishart distribution:
L(β,Σ) ∝ |Σ|−3p/2exp{−1
2
(Φ− Φˆ)′[Σ ⊗ (Z ′Z)−1]−1(Φ− Φˆ)} × ...
|Σ|−[(T−3(p+1)−1)+3+1]/2exp{−1
2
[tr(Σ−1 (Υ− ZΦˆ)′(Υ− ZΦˆ)]} (B.41)
L(β,Σ) ∝MVN (Φˆ,Σ ⊗ (Z ′Z)−1)× IW(Sˆ, ν) (B.42)
where Sˆ = (Υ− ZΦˆ)′(Υ− ZΦˆ) and ν = T − 3(p+ 1)− 1
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B.2.3 Posterior estimates
let us start by re-writing Equation (B.41):
L(β,Σ) ∝ |Σ|−3p/2exp{−1
2
(β − βˆ)′[Σ ⊗ Z ′Z−1]−1(β − βˆ)} × ...
exp{−1
2
[tr(Σ−1 (Υ− ZΦˆ)′(Υ− ZΦˆ)]} (B.43)
Now, let us plug Equations (B.21), (B.23) and (B.43) into (B.14) gives the joint posterior distri-
bution for β and Σ:
p1(β,Σ | YT ) ∝ |Σ|−3p/2exp{−1
2
(β − β0)′(Σ ⊗ Ω0)−1(β − β0)} × ...
|Σ|−(ν0+3+1)/2exp{−1
2
tr(Σ−1 S0)} × ...
exp{−1
2
(β − βˆ)′[Σ ⊗ (Z ′Z)−1]−1(β − βˆ)} × ...
exp{−1
2
[tr(Σ−1 (Υ− ZΦˆ)′(Υ− ZΦˆ)]} (B.44)
p1(β,Σ | YT ) ∝ ...
|Σ|−(T+3p+ν0+3+1)/2exp{−1
2
[(β− βˆ)′[Σ⊗(Z ′Z)−1]−1(β− βˆ))+(β−β0)(Σ⊗Ω0)−1(β−β0)]}× ...
exp{−1
2
tr[Σ−1 [S0 + (Υ− ZΦˆ)′(Υ− ZΦˆ)]} (B.45)
let us develop the argument inside the first exponential:
(β − βˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)(β − βˆ)) + (β − β0)(Σ ⊗ Ω0)−1(β − β0) = ...
β′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)β + βˆ′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)βˆ − 2β′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)βˆ + ...
β′(Σ ⊗ Ω0)−1β + β′0(Σ ⊗ Ω0)−1β0 − 2β′(Σ ⊗ Ω0)−1β0 (B.46)
Re-arranging, we obtain:
(β − βˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)(β − βˆ)) + (β − β0)(Σ ⊗ Ω0)−1(β − β0)
= β′[(Σ⊗Ω0)−1+Σ−1 ⊗Z ′Z]β−2β′[(Σ⊗Ω0)−1β0+(Σ−1 ⊗Z ′Z)βˆ]+βˆ′(Σ−1 ⊗Z ′Z)βˆ+β′0(Σ⊗Ω0)−1β0
= β′Σ−1 ⊗ (Ω−10 + Z ′Z)β − 2β′Σ−1 ⊗ (Ω−10 β0 + Z ′Zβˆ) + βˆ′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)βˆ + β′0(Σ ⊗ Ω0)−1β0
(B.47)
Where I define Ω¯ = [Ω−10 + Z
′Z]−1 and β¯ = Ω¯[Ω−10 β0 + Z
′Zβˆ]
Then,
(β − βˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)(β − βˆ)) + (β − β0)(Σ ⊗ Ω0)−1(β − β0)
= β′Σ−1 ⊗ Ω¯−1β − 2β′Σ−1 ⊗ Ω¯−1β¯ + βˆ′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)βˆ + β′0(Σ ⊗ Ω0)−1β0 (B.48)
= (β − β¯)′(Σ ⊗ Ω¯)−1(β − β¯) − β¯(Σ ⊗ Ω¯)−1β¯ + βˆ′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)βˆ + β′0(Σ ⊗ Ω0)−1β0 (B.49)
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Now, let us plug Equation (B.49) into Equation (B.45):
p1(β,Σ | YT ) ∝ |Σ|−3p/2exp{−1
2
(β − β¯)′(Σ ⊗ Ω¯)−1(β − β¯)} × ...
|Σ|−(T+ν0+3+1)/2exp{−1
2
[−β¯′(Σ ⊗ Ω¯)−1β¯ + βˆ′(Σ−1 ⊗ Z ′Z)βˆ + β′0(Σ ⊗ Ω0)−1β0 + (B.50)
tr(Σ−1 [S0 + (Υ− ZΦˆ)′(Υ− ZΦˆ))]} (B.51)
p1(β,Σ | YT ) ∝ |Σ|−3p/2exp{−1
2
(β − β¯)′(Σ ⊗ Ω¯)−1(β − β¯)}×
...|Σ|−(T+ν0+3+1)/2exp{−1
2
tr[Σ−1 (−β¯′Ω¯−1β¯ + βˆ′(Z ′Z)βˆ+
β′0Ω
−1
0 β0 + S0 + (Υ− ZΦˆ)′(Υ− ZΦˆ))]} (B.52)
p1(β,Σ | YT ) ∝ |Σ|−3p/2exp{−1
2
(β− β¯)′(Σ⊗ Ω¯)−1(β− β¯)}|Σ|−(T+ν0+3+1)/2exp{−1
2
tr(Σ−1 S¯)}
(B.53)
Where S¯ = βˆ′(Z ′Z)βˆ+β′0Ω
−1
0 β0−β¯′Ω¯−1β¯+S0+(Υ−ZΦˆ)′(Υ−ZΦˆ)) = Υ′Υ+β′0Ω−10 β0−β¯′Ω¯−1β¯+S0
The conditional posterior distribution of Σ is given by:
p1(Σ | YT ) ∝
∫
β
p1(β,Σ | YT )dβ (B.54)
p1(Σ, | YT ) ∝
∫
β
|Σ|−3p/2exp{−1
2
(β−β¯)′(Σ⊗Ω¯)−1(β−β¯)}|Σ|−(T+ν0+3+1)/2exp{−1
2
tr(Σ−1 S¯)}dβ
(B.55)
p1(Σ | YT ) ∝ |Σ|−(T+ν0+3+1)/2exp{−1
2
tr(Σ−1 S¯)}
∫
β
|Σ|−3p/2exp{−1
2
(β−β¯)′(Σ⊗Ω¯)−1(β−β¯)}dβ
(B.56)
Recall that ∫
β
|Σ|−3p/2exp{−1
2
(β − β¯)′(Σ ⊗ Ω¯)−1(β − β¯)}dβ = 1 (B.57)
Therefore,
p1(Σ | YT ) ∝ |Σ|−(T+ν0+3+1)/2exp{−1
2
tr(Σ−1 S¯)} (B.58)
We recognize an inverse Wishart distribution:
p1(Σ | YT ) ∼ IW(S¯, ν¯1) (B.59)
where S¯ = Υ′Υ + S0 + β′0Ω
−1
0 β0 − β¯′Ω¯−1β¯
and ν¯1 = T + ν0
Now, conditional posterior distribution of β is given by:
p1(β | YT ) ∝
∫
Σ
p1(β,Σ | YT )dΣ (B.60)
p1(β | YT ) ∝
∫
Σ
|Σ|−3p/2exp{−1
2
(β−β¯)′(Σ⊗Ω¯)−1(β−β¯)}|Σ|−(T+ν0+3+1)/2exp{−1
2
tr(Σ−1 S¯)}dΣ
(B.61)
71
p1(β | YT ) ∝
∫
Σ
|Σ|−3p/2exp{−1
2
(β−β¯)′(Σ⊗Ω¯)−1(β−β¯)}|Σ|−(T+ν0+3+1)/2exp{−1
2
tr(Σ−1 S¯)}dΣ
(B.62)
Using Equation (B.35), we have
p1(β | YT ) ∝
∫
Σ
|Σ|−(T+3p+ν0+3+1)/2exp{−1
2
trΣ−1 [S¯ + (β − β¯)′Ω¯−1(β − β¯)]}dΣ (B.63)
However,∫
Σ
|S¯ + (β − β¯)′Ω¯−1(β − β¯)| 3p+ν¯12
2
3(3p+ν¯1)
2 Γ3
(
3p+ν¯1
2
) |Σ|−(T+3p+ν0+3+1)/2exp{−1
2
trΣ−1 [S¯ + (β − β¯)′Ω¯−1(β − β¯)]}dΣ = 1
(B.64)
It is the integral of an Inverse-Wishart distribution, therefore:
p1(β | YT ) ∝ |S¯ + (β − β¯)′Ω¯−1(β − β¯)|−
3p+ν¯1
2 2
3(3p+ν¯1)
2 Γ3
(
3p+ ν¯1
2
)
(B.65)
Getting rid of the constants leads to:
p1(β | YT ) ∝ |S¯ + (β − β¯)′Ω¯−1(β − β¯)|−
3p+ν¯1
2 (B.66)
Since ν¯1 = T + ν0.
p1(β | YT ) ∝ |S¯|−
3p+T+ν¯0
2 |I3 + S¯−1(β − β¯)′Ω¯−1(β − β¯)|−
3p+T+ν¯0
2 (B.67)
p1(β | YT ) ∝ |I3 + S¯−1(β − β¯)′Ω¯−1(β − β¯)|−
3p+T+ν¯0
2 (B.68)
p1(β | YT ) ∝ |I3 + S¯−1(β − β¯)′Ω¯−1(β − β¯)|
−(T+ν0−3+1)+3+3p−1
2 (B.69)
This is the kernel of a Matrix-student distribution:
p1(β | YT ) ∝MT (β¯, S¯, Ω¯, ν2) (B.70)
with ν2 = T + ν0 − 3 + 1
It can be shown that this is equivalent to drawing the parameter vector β from the following
multivariate Normal distribution:
p1(β | Σ,YT ) ∼MVN (β¯,Σ ⊗ Ω¯) (B.71)
Now that we know the form of the posterior distributions of β and Σ, we need to draw from
this conjugate Normal inverse-Wishart posterior distribution over the structural parametrization
conditional on the zero, traditional and Narrative sign restrictions. This is done thanks to the
following the Algorithm from Arias, Rubio-Ramirez & Waggoner (2018).
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B.2.4 Algorithm: draw conditional on zero, traditional and Narrative sign restric-
tions
Start at i = 1, where i is the number of iteration.
Step 0: Setup
Define n, the number of draws to reach.
Step 1: Iteration i, draw Σ
(i)

Σ
(i)
 ∼ IW(S¯, ν¯1) with S¯ = Υ′Υ + S0 + β′0Ω−10 β0 − β¯′Ω¯−1β¯, ν¯1 = T + ν0, Ω¯ = [Ω−10 + Z ′Z]−1 and
β¯ = Ω¯[Ω−10 β0 + Z
′Zβˆ]
Step 2: Iteration i, draw β(i)
β(i) ∼MVN (β¯,Σ ⊗ Ω¯) Φ(i) = vec−1(β(i))
Step 3: Iteration i
Draw a random orthonormal matrix Qi satisfying the zero restrictions (see Appendix B.1.2)
Step 4: Transform reduced form parameters into structural parameters
From Equation (B.16), Υt =
∑p
k=1 ΦkΥt−k + t =
∑p
k=1BZkΥt−k +Bwt
Bi = P iQi with P i a lower triangular matrix from of Cholesky decomposition of Σ
(i)

Step 5: Structural IRF
Compute the structural impulse response functions: C˜j,iq = C
j,i
q B
i
Step 6: Check traditional sign restrictions
If traditional sign restrictions are respected, go to Step 7. Otherwise, go back to Step 0
Step 7: Structural shocks and Historical Decomposition
Compute structural shocks and Historical Decompositions
Step 8: Check Narrative sign restrictions
If Narrative sign restrictions are respected, go to Step 9. Otherwise, go back to Step 0
Step 9: Loop
Keep the draw (β(i),Σ
(i)
 ). If i < n, i = i+ 1 and go to Step 1, else stop.
Step 10: Resample
Resample the n successful draws using weights from the zero and Narrative sign restrictions pro-
cedure, following Arias, Rubio-Ramirez & Waggoner (2018) and Antol´ın-Dı´az & Rubio-Ramı´rez
(2018).
B.3 Shock-specific Conditional Forecasts
The algorithm below used to draw shock-specific conditional forecasts relies on Dieppe, Legrand
& Van Roye (2016).
Conditions of the type υ3,t+h = υ¯3 are conditions on the structural shocks wt from Equation
(24). These conditions can be gathered in a linear form and stacked in a linear system:
Rw = c (B.72)
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where R ∈Mr×(3×h)(R), with r ≤ 3× h the number of conditions, is the matrix of linear restric-
tions containing the relevant coefficients of the Wold decomposition C¯jts = C
j
tsB
i for ts ∈ [[1, h]],
w = (w1t+1, w
2
t+1, w
3
t+1, ..., w
1
t+h, w
2
t+h, w
3
t+h)
′ ∈ R3×h is the vector of structural shock at each fore-
casted date and c = (υ¯3,t1 − υ˜3,t+t1 , ..., υ¯3,tr − υ˜3,t+tr )′ ∈ Rr, with ts ∈ [[1, h]] where s ∈ [[1, r]] and
r ≤ h is the vector containing the differences between the conditional values and the unconditional
forecasts from Equation (28).
w3 shock is constructive for υ3,ts , whereas w
1 and w2 are not. Besides, at each date where a
condition is set on υ3,ts , υ3 constitute its own block.
For example, to set a condition at date t = t+ ts, Equation (B.72) rewrites:
(
φ˜ts−1,31 φ˜ts−1,32 φ˜ts−1,33 . . . φ˜0,31 φ˜0,32 φ˜0,33 0 0 0 . . .
)

w1t+1
w2t+1
w3t+1
...
w1t+ts
w2t+ts
w3t+ts
.
..
w1t+h
w2t+h
w3t+h

= (υ¯3,ts − υ˜3,t+ts )
(B.73)
where (φ˜ts−1,31, φ˜ts−1,32, φ˜ts−1,33) is the third line of C¯
j
ts−1
This simplifies to:
(
φ˜ts−1,31 φ˜ts−1,32 φ˜ts−1,33 . . . φ˜0,31 φ˜0,32 φ˜0,33
)

w1t+1
w2t+1
w3t+1
...
w1t+ts
w2t+ts
w3t+ts

= (υ¯3,ts − υ˜3,t+ts ) (B.74)
Now, as w1 and w2 are non-constructive shocks, I can draw them from N (0, 1) and transfer them
to the right-hand-side of Equation (B.74):
( 0 0 φ˜ts−1,33 . . . 0 0 φ˜0,33 )

w1t+1
w2t+1
w3t+1
...
w1t+ts
w2t+ts
w3t+ts

= ...
(υ¯3,ts − υ˜3,t+ts − φ˜ts−1,31w1t+1 − φ˜ts−1,32w2t+1 − . . .− φ˜0,31w1t+ts − φ˜0,32w2t+ts)
(B.75)
The next step is to draw the structural shocks w3t |Rw=c that satisfy the above conditions. This
can be done following Waggoner & Zha (1999):
w ∼ N (w¯, Λ¯) (B.76)
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where w¯ = R′(RR′)−1c and Λ¯ = I3 −R′(RR′)−1R
Draws of w1 and w2 are discarded as they have already been drown.
Then, repeat Equation (B.73) to Equation (B.76) for the next period at which a condition is
imposed, taking as known all previous structural shocks (that have already been drawn).
B.4 Results
Figure 23: Structural shocks - Identification Scheme I
Solid grey area corresponds to a recession period as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
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Figure 24: Fry & Pagan median target Impulse Response Functions - Identification Scheme I
Figure 25: Historical Decomposition of the term premium - Identification Scheme I
Historical decomposition is expressed in deviation from initial conditions
Solid grey area corresponds to a recession period as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
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Figure 26: Historical Decomposition of the Terminal rate - Identification Scheme I
Historical decomposition is expressed in deviation from initial conditions
Solid grey area corresponds to a recession period as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
Figure 27: Counterfactual Real GDP - Identification Scheme I
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Figure 28: Counterfactual Prices - Identification Scheme I
Table 8: Regressions Fit
Equation (30) (31) (29)
RMSE 2.67 1.55 0.31
Sample period: 2004Q4-2018Q4
RMSE stands for Root Mean Square Error
C DCC-GARCH model
DCC(M,N)-GARCH(Pi,Qi) model assuming data have been demeaned:
Υt = H
1/2
t zt with zt
iid∼ N (0, I3) (C.1)
where Υt = (υ1,t, υ2,t, υ3,t)
′,
Ht = DtRtDt (C.2)
where Ht ∈M3×3(R) is the conditional variance-covariance matrix of interest,
Dt = diag(
√
h1t,
√
h1t,
√
h3t) (C.3)
where Dt ∈M3×3(R) is a diagonal matrix of standard deviation of Υt,
hit = αi0 +
Qi∑
q=1
αiqΥ
2
i,t−q +
Pi∑
p=1
βiphi,t−p (C.4)
78
with i ∈ [[1, 3]] is the GARCH Equation,
Rt = Q
∗−1
t QtQ
∗−1
t (C.5)
where Rt ∈M3×3(R) is the conditional correlation matrix and Q∗t ∈M3×3(R) is a diagonal matrix
with the square root of the diagonal elements of Qt at the diagonal with
Qt = (1−
M∑
m=1
am −
N∑
n=1
bn)Q¯t +
M∑
m=1
amt−1′t−1 +
N∑
n=1
bnQt−1 (C.6)
with am ∈ R, bn ∈ R is the DCC Equation,
Q¯t =
1
T
T∑
t=1
t−1′t−1 (C.7)
where Q¯t is the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of the standardized errors t, with
t = D
−1
t Υt (C.8)
Here I employ a DCC(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) for simplicity, hence GARCH Equation (C.4) becomes:
hit = αi0 + αiΥ
2
i,t−1 + βihi,t−1 (C.9)
with i ∈ [[1, 3]]. DCC Equation (C.6) boils down to:
Qt = (1− a− b)Q¯t + at−1′t−1 + bQt−1 (C.10)
with a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 and a+ b < 1 to ensure that Ht is positive definite.
Last, the log-likelihood of the system of equations is given by:
L(θ) = −1
2
T∑
t=1
(
nln(2pi) + 2ln(|Dt|) + ln(|Rt|) + Υ′tD−1t R−1t D−1t Υt
)
(C.11)
where θ contains all parameters split into two groups: the ones from Equation (C.9) and the ones
from Equation (C.10).
The estimation is performed in three stages by Quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE). I first estimate
the conditional variance parameters from Equation (C.9) and then the correlation parameters from
Equation (C.10). Finally, the log-likelihood is maximized conditionally on the previously estimated
parameters.42
C.1 Results
42I thank Kevin Sheppard from the University of Oxford for sharing his code.
It is available at: http://www.kevinsheppard.com/MFE Toolbox
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Figure 29: Covariance between the term premium and the cost of borrowing
Sample: 2004:M9-2018:M12
Solid grey areas correspond to recession periods as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
D Data
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Figure 30: Consumer Price Index and Real GDP
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and log real GDP (interpolated) from 2004:M9 to 2018:M12
Solid grey areas correspond to recession periods as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
Figure 31: PPI, CPI and cost of borrowing
Sample period: 2004Q9-2018Q4
Solid grey area corresponds to a recession period as defined by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Solid red area corresponds to the QE period
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